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Foreword
The Baby Boomer generation is retiring and aspirations 
for later life will prove very different to previous 
generations. Those retiring at 65 can expect to live for 
another 23 years, compared with 16 in 1980, and the 
number of people over 65 is set to rise 52% between 
2015 and 2040.
It is of course welcome to see people living longer, 
healthier lives, with more opportunities and plans for 
retirement. But this presents increasing challenges in 
terms of how people manage their finances and for the 
housing market.
The needs and ambitions of those in later life are 
becoming more diverse, ranging from household 
renovations, passing wealth to the next generations 
and supporting them onto the housing ladder, starting 
a business venture, contributing to future care costs 
or seeking more suitable housing for their lifestyle, 
including downsizing.
Much of this will require a boost in their finances, but 
age has previously acted as a barrier to lending in later 
life. The financial sector has perhaps been slow to react 
to the changing needs of the population, but this is 
rapidly changing. It used to be that equity release was 
the only financial product available, but over the past 
few years, the choice for over 50s has expanded. 
Alongside equity release, there are now Retirement 
Interest Only (RIO) products with no defined term or 
minimum equity requirements, along with repayment 
and fixed-term interest-only mortgages that can be 
taken out up to the age of 85. This broadens the options 
available to those in, or about to be in, retirement. 
Financial advice for older borrowers will remain crucial 
in driving awareness of the growing range of options. 
And specialist lenders will play a vital role as they invest 
time and care in assessing suitability of options to 
individual circumstances, ensuring lending is responsible 
with high levels of customer care. 
Widening the options for older homeowners requires 
changing mind-sets further afield than the financial 
sector. The Government’s recent interventions to help 
first-time buyers have been welcome but, to improve the 
housing market for the longer-term, there needs to be a 
refocus towards helping ‘last-time buyers’, as this report 
suggests, providing retirees with financial freedoms and 
creating incentives to downsize, where appropriate, to 
free up housing stock for younger generations.
More detailed and holistic regional plans are also 
required to identify the needs of each area. House 
building needs to become more diverse, with a focus 
on delivering a range of tenure that is suited to the 
requirements of different age groups.
This report provides many practical and achievable 
recommendations to help tackle financial and housing 
issues for the ageing population. Creating a housing 
market that works well for everyone – renters, first-time 
buyers, home movers, last-time buyers and landlords – 
should be the aim for all of us. This requires innovation, 
imagination and creativity to ensure the sector meets the 
continually shifting needs of the British population.
Sue Hayes
Group Managing Director for Retail Finance, 
Aldermore Bank
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Preface
This is the second paper by Prof Mayhew that the CSFI 
has published, and it advances the arguments that he first 
put forward in ‘The Dependency Trap’ (January 2018). 
This time, the focus is on enabling people – particularly 
older people – to monetise the very substantial wealth 
that is trapped in the UK’s housing stock, which is 
often inappropriate for their needs. One of the (many) 
important findings that Prof Mayhew has come up with 
is that, on paper at least, the UK is not short of housing; 
rather, it is short of the right sort of housing – with too 
many older people, in particular, stuck in housing that 
no longer suits them. Free them up to downsize (or 
“rightsize”), he suggests, and we would go some way 
to resolving a chronic housing problem – while, at the 
same time, providing them with a way to cope with the 
vicissitudes of later life, in particular the (often crippling) 
cost of social care.
There are many important recommendations in this 
paper, but (in my opinion) the most important are those 
focused on that section of the market that Prof Mayhew 
describes as “last-time buyers”. They are often asset-
rich but trapped in properties that no longer meet their 
needs – and, indeed, that block others for whom such 
properties would be more appropriate. Changes in stamp 
duty and/or capital gains tax should be on the agenda, 
as should policies with regard to porting mortgages, 
switching from one type of mortgage to another and 
using the wealth tied up in housing to fund long-term 
care. Clearly, there is a big role for the financial services 
industry, which has already moved into this space with 
equity release mortgages. In particular, there is a lot of 
room for new insurance-based products, possibly with 
premiums not falling due until the insured goes into 
long-term care or dies. 
I am delighted that Prof Mayhew has agreed to let us 
publish his paper, which I really believe can change the 
debate in Westminster. I am also delighted that we have 
been able to obtain support for publication from Cass 
Business School (where Prof Mayhew is based) and from 
Aldermore, one of a new breed of ‘challenger’ banks.  We 
very much appreciate their help. Finally, I would very 
much like to thank my colleague, Jane Fuller (latterly 
financial editor at the Financial Times), who worked 
closely with Prof Mayhew to ensure that the complexity 
of the issues he was dealing with did not make his paper 
a dull read. To the contrary, it is accessible, provocative – 
and, I hope, the kind of paper that makes politicians in 
Westminster sit up and take notice. 
Andrew Hilton
Director, CSFI
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The Last-Time Buyer: housing and 
finance for an ageing society
Les Mayhew
Number 130 February 2019
Summary and main recommendations
Demographic change and 
household patterns
By 2040, the UK population is forecast to grow to 
72.7m, up from just over 65m in 2015. The number 
of inhabitants aged 65+ is set to jump from 11.6m to 
17.7m. Demographic analysis suggests that demand for 
accommodation could add the equivalent of two new 
towns, each with 100,000 homes, every year for 25 years. 
The paradox, bearing in mind the UK’s much discussed 
‘housing crisis’, is that the current housing stock is, on 
paper, sufficient to meet today’s needs. In 2015, there 
were 28.3m housing units compared with demand from 
27.4m households. The gap is accounted for by second 
homes and vacant properties. 
Also significant is the change in occupancy patterns as 
multi-generation households have dwindled and older 
ones increased. Average household size has fallen from 
2.48 in 1980 to 2.36 in 2018, largely due to the ageing 
population. If household size today were the same as in 
1980, there would be 1.3m more dwellings available.
While a growing population inevitably means that 
more homes must be built, just as pressing is the need 
to align housing supply with actual household needs. 
In this context, under-occupancy, a feature of an ageing 
population, is as much of a problem as the shortfall in 
homes being built. If people lived in homes more suited 
to their needs, 50,000 fewer homes would need to be 
built each year.
This research combines demographic data, including 
ageing, with that on household composition and 
housing supply to create a tool for forecasting housing 
needs, called the Dwelling Index. One of the key 
findings is that the number of people set to live alone 
will increase by 30% by 2040.
Housing supply
Although the number of homes being built has picked 
up, it still falls short of what is required to fill a gap 
created over many years. We agree with the government 
White Paper, published in 2017, that failures in the 
planning system are a contributory factor and must be 
tackled with urgency. 
But the issue is not just one of quantity. The ageing 
population has exposed a shortage of suitable properties 
for people aged 55+ wishing to downsize from a family 
home. Consequently, there is increasing misalignment 
between dwelling size and dwelling need.
CSFI
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Limited options for people wishing to downsize 
exacerbate this. As well as offering a wider choice of 
apartments, future construction should take account 
of the growing demand for homes in purpose-built 
retirement communities, with access to care services. 
Recommendation: Greater encouragement to downsize and 
to orientate new construction towards older, or ‘last-time’, 
buyers should be part of the policy mix to correct the 
misalignment between the housing stock and housing needs. 
Recommendation: Housing needs are predictable, whereas 
house building is cyclical. The building industry should 
be encouraged to focus on satisfying housing needs 
via consistent policy guidelines, the easing of planning 
restrictions, infrastructure investment and better co-
operation with local authorities.
Private house building is well below previous levels and 
council properties sold under the ‘right to buy’ have not 
been replaced. Local authorities and housing associations 
need greater flexibility to build affordable homes. 
Financial help for first-time buyers should be seen in 
the same light as housing benefit support for private 
and social renters. These subsidies would be much lower 
if there were more affordable homes and social rented 
accommodation. 
Recommendation: The government’s announcement, in 
October 2018, that borrowing restrictions will be relaxed 
to enable local councils to build additional homes is a 
welcome change of policy, which could go further. The 
outcome needs to be closely monitored to ensure it 
drives up the availability of affordable housing for rent.
House prices
Historically, the best predictor of house prices was average 
earnings, but the link has been ruptured. Since 2000, 
average house prices have trebled whereas gross earnings 
have only risen by about 60%. This has led to high levels 
of mortgage debt – for first-time buyers, in particular.
Changes on this scale are due to a combination of 
burgeoning demand, insufficient and erratic supply, a 
shortage of social housing and a growth in second home 
ownership. On the demand side, for example, we find 
that, without immigration, prices would have been 
around 6% lower on average since 1980 and 12% lower 
if just considering the period since 2000.
The prospect for future price rises is highly uncertain. 
Studies have shown that falling house prices are 
positively correlated with the dependency ratio – the 
ratio of people of working age to those aged 65+. The 
UK is experiencing a steep fall in this ratio from 3.8 in 
2007 to 2.4 by 2030.
We find that prices are strongly correlated with changes 
to the Dwelling Index in the medium to long-term. 
Future trends will increasingly be dictated by the impact 
of an ageing population. Pressure on prices will turn 
downwards in the 2020s as baby boomers die out, 
freeing up property. 
Housing policy
A clear conclusion of this research is that downsizing 
must be encouraged. Yet many of the policies have 
the opposite effect (e.g. a lack of suitable dwellings to 
downsize into, high transaction costs due to stamp duty 
and other expenses). The growth in second homes and 
vacant properties has also exacerbated the shortage. 
Better targeted financial incentives are needed, including 
switching attention to last-time buyers.
There is a lack of transparency of and accountability for 
different government initiatives, mostly aimed at helping 
first-time buyers. For example, it is unclear where some 
schemes begin and end, and what the time limits are for 
funding programmes. 
Recommendation: The government should focus on 
last-time buyers as part of its housing strategy. Policies 
to encourage downsizing should be aligned and the 
tax system adjusted to achieve this effect. Supply side 
constraints, such as the lack of suitable homes for 
downsizers, should be addressed.
Recommendation: There should be a joined-up approach 
to these initiatives under a single housing programme, 
monitored by a trustworthy body such as the Office for 
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National Statistics or the National Audit Office. This 
should report on how objectives are being met and how 
the costs are split between public and private sector.
Financial services
Many challenges are created by an ageing population in a 
country with tight housing supply and much wealth tied 
up in bricks and mortar. Aligning the housing stock with 
shrinking household size, by encouraging downsizing 
and better targeted building, is an important part of the 
solution.
Inflated house prices have left many home owners with 
windfalls from which they struggle to benefit in their 
lifetimes, and which might be consumed by inheritance 
tax. In principle, housing wealth can be used in many 
ways, including to release cash by downsizing, make gifts 
to dependents or pay for care.
 
But there are limitations and timing issues. Personal 
objectives are key but using housing wealth to achieve 
them can be complicated, calling for affordable advice. 
Innovation coupled with prudent lending is vital and 
there is scope to extend and develop products based on 
flexible lending arrangements and insurance. They may 
also aid inheritance planning. 
Developments in the market include equity release, 
which is growing very fast. Lending topped £3bn in 
2017 and reached an estimated £4bn in 2018. Unlike 
traditional mortgages, money can be drawn down to 
suit needs. Loan repayment is after death or transfer 
into a care home, so there is no impact on current 
consumption. 
Other developments in flexible mortgages also help 
to meet people’s needs from their 50s onwards when, 
typically, earnings start to decline. These include switching 
from repayment to interest-only mortgages to reduce 
outgoings, or taking out a new mortgage to release funds 
for gifting or adapting a home to elderly living.
Housing wealth can also be used to insure against 
the cost of long-term care without affecting current 
consumption if the premium is paid after death. 
Knowing that care needs are covered provides peace of 
mind for financial planning in old age.
Recommendation: To make downsizing easier, the ability 
to port mortgages, switch from one type of mortgage to 
another and repay early without onerous penalties are 
all part of the mix. So is the need to plan for income in 
retirement. Under any of these proposals, there will be 
a greater need for affordable advice and intermediary 
services.
Recommendation: More people should pay for their care 
using insurance-based approaches, or by setting aside 
some of their housing wealth.
National and local plans
While planning delays obviously need to be tackled, a 
practical problem is that local plans are piecemeal and of 
variable quality. They also make insufficient use of data 
to inform the process. 
Population decline, mainly in northern cities, and 
growth elsewhere has fuelled imbalances between 
housing demand and supply, as well as social inequality. 
Within cities, changing shopping habits have created 
opportunities for redevelopment.
Recommendation: Housing requirements should be 
determined at a national and local level on a holistic 
basis, drawing on under-used data sources – including 
demographic changes – along the lines of the Dwelling 
Index developed for this report.  
Recommendation: Improved plans are needed for regions 
that have suffered population decline to modernise 
infrastructure and attract investment. The change of use 
of urban sites, such as empty high street stores, should be 
encouraged. 
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Introduction
Turn to any newspaper and you will see that the UK 
is in the midst of a housing crisis. Too few houses are 
being built, there are not enough affordable homes, 
homelessness is rising, council waiting lists number 
over 1.1m, and children are being forced into poverty 
through high rents and cuts in benefits. One could be 
forgiven for thinking the end of the world is nigh.
 
These shrill headlines are symptomatic of a deeper issue 
– namely the effects of population growth and ageing. 
This report explores a new phenomenon: in the UK as a 
whole, there is ample housing, but a huge mismatch exists 
between housing needs, on the one hand, and the supply 
of suitable accommodation, on the other. The aim of this 
research is to understand the dimensions of the mismatch 
and to suggest ways to realign supply and demand.  
Demographic trends
The report takes the long view by focusing on 
demographic trends, particularly ageing, and how these 
shape household formation, occupancy and dwelling size. 
It addresses questions such as how demand is changing 
for one, two or three, or more, person households, how 
many bedrooms they need and so on. A key finding is 
that there is a paucity of choice for people living in multi-
bedroomed houses who would benefit from downsizing.
In 2015, the UK population was 65.1m; this year it is 
expected to reach 66.9m. By 2040, it is forecast to grow 
to 72.7m, of whom 17.7m, or about one in four, will be 
aged 65+. This is 6.1m more than in 2015. One driver is 
the post-war baby boom, another is that people are living 
much longer. In 1980, life expectancy at age 65 was 15 
years, by 2040 it is expected to be 24 years. This means 
that property inheritance, an important way to transfer 
ownership, is postponed or even skips generations. 
Where a partner has died, the survivor often lives alone 
with few financial options but to stay put. Yet they face 
increasing risks to their wellbeing in homes that may 
be ill-adapted to their deteriorating health. Housing 
solutions for older living are much talked about, but 
without much visible action; indeed, firms working in 
this sector say supply is falling behind demand.
Shortage of affordable homes 
to buy
A consequence of older people staying put is that it 
aggravates the shortage of affordable homes for younger 
buyers. The other element of constricted supply is a 
dramatic fall in the number of homes being built, from 
250,000 a year in 1980 to a nadir of 133,000 in 2013. 
Is this the crux of the problem, or is it a case of the 
wrong kind of home being built? 
Home ownership has fallen from a peak of 69% in 2000 to 
61% today. Local authority renting, which once accounted 
for 30% of occupancy, has also been in steep decline with 
the sell-off of council dwellings. This has only been partially 
replaced by housing association tenancies, which account 
for 10% of the total. The mix of occupancy types has 
changed, with private renting growing from around 10% of 
all forms of occupancy in 2000 to nearly 20% today. 
Private renting serves a purpose and is favoured by 
young adults, but it brings other problems. For example, 
The English Housing Survey1 finds that private rented 
1. The English Housing Survey: 2008/9 to 2016/17. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/english-housing-survey
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properties are increasingly susceptible to over-crowding 
and more likely to suffer dilapidation, while owner-
occupied properties are becoming under-occupied. 
Work commissioned by local authorities shows that 
areas of private renting suffer more antisocial behaviour, 
especially in deprived areas. 
One rarely discussed reason for the growth of private 
renting and the steep rise in house prices is immigration. 
Net immigration to the UK averaged about 30,000 a 
year between 1980 and 1999; between 2000 and 2017 
it was 236,000 – eight times higher, peaking at 332,000 
in 2015. Although this has fallen in the past couple of 
years, cumulatively this has added about 4.8m people 
since 1980. This is bound to have had a significant 
impact on the housing market. 
Political parties of all persuasions agree that more 
houses must be built, which means more land being 
made available – enough to build two moderately sized 
new towns each year2. The Labour Party’s prescription 
is to build an extra 1m homes over a 10-year period 
and the Conservatives plan to push the annual total 
up to 300,0003. What accompanying measures and 
policies would make a difference to the supply/demand 
imbalance?
Supply, demand and house 
prices
The UK’s housing crisis requires a more sophisticated 
approach than simply building more. This research has 
developed a Dwelling Index to calibrate and forecast 
housing needs, taking in data on demography, housing 
supply and household composition. A surprising finding 
is that the UK’s actual housing stock outstrips demand. In 
2015, for instance, there were 28.3m residential units – 
houses and apartments – compared with demand of 27.4m. 
The most plausible explanation is that a number of 
homes stand wholly vacant or are second homes. There 
are definitional problems between these two categories, 
but census estimates suggest that there were 1.1m 
unoccupied dwellings in 2011. The growth in second 
homes is linked to the baby boomer generation, which 
has become richer on the back of property wealth and, 
since the financial crisis, has put more faith in bricks and 
mortar as a saving vehicle, including buy-to-let. 
Another trend has been the fragmentation of 
households, with fewer homes containing multi-
generations at the same time as the population has been 
ageing. The number of occupants per dwelling based 
on the Dwelling Index has fallen from 2.48 in 1980 to 
2.36 in 2018. If household sizes today were the same as 
in 1980, there would be at least 1.3m more dwellings 
available. In addition, if people downsized into homes 
more suited to their space, or bedroom, requirements, 
50,000 fewer homes would need to be built each year.  
The net result is that although there are enough 
properties to go around, there are not enough on the 
market at prices first-time buyers, and some young 
families, can afford. Since 1980, average house prices 
have risen more than twelve-fold, whereas average 
earnings have gone up only six-fold. From 1980 to 2000, 
earnings and house prices rose more or less in lockstep, 
but the relationship has since dissipated. 
There are other long-term indicators of tightening 
supply. For example, the gap between the rate of 
growth in the housing stock relative to the rate of 
growth in demand has been falling since 1985. This has 
corresponded with a rise in prices, with particularly large 
hikes in 1988 and 2003.
The reaction of banks and their regulators to the credit 
excesses that fuelled the financial crisis can be seen in the 
housing market. The number of housing transactions 
peaked in 2007 at 1.6m and then halved between 2008 
and 2011, since when they have steadied at around 
1.2m. Another measure of the slowdown is that average 
duration of occupancy per dwelling has increased from 
16 years in 2006 to 23 years today.
2. On 7 February 2017 the government published a Housing White Paper, entitled ‘Fixing our broken housing market’. 
3. Announced in the 2017 budget.
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With interest rates falling to record lows, inflating the 
amounts that can be borrowed as a multiple of earnings, 
prices have moved beyond the reach of most first-time 
buyers. Putting together a deposit in a reasonable period 
has become almost impossible without, for example, 
parental help. 
The long-term effects include exacerbating wealth 
inequalities, while high house prices and rents squeeze 
consumption and hence damage GDP. The problem is 
that interest rate changes are designed to cover a range of 
financial policy goals and not just the housing market. 
Will prices continue to climb? One of the key findings 
of this report is that the ageing of the population is likely 
to lead to a fall in house prices in the 2020s. This is due 
to a combination of two factors. One is a levelling off 
in the working-age population, which traditionally is 
a key driver of housing demand and therefore prices. 
The second is that baby boomers will gradually die out, 
relinquishing their homes to the next generations. This 
should prompt new ways of thinking about housing 
needs, both during the transition and afterwards. 
The Dwelling Index
In published research there is little attempt to tie these 
factors together into a coherent analysis. The tendency 
is to cover only a segment of the market or a short-term 
change in prices or market conditions. One reason for 
this fragmentation is the diversity of information and 
data sources – from mortgage lenders, house builders, 
UK Finance or local authority housing departments. 
This is mirrored across central government, with sources 
ranging from the Valuation Agency and the Land 
Registry to whole departments such as the Ministry 
of Housing, Communities and Local Government 
(MHCLG), the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). The 
combined effect gives rise to confusion and obfuscation 
for anyone trying to study housing. 
In this research, we introduce the Dwelling Index as a 
core measure of housing needs. It is based on an imputed 
number of dwellings lived in by persons of a given age. 
Over a typical life span, the living arrangements of 
individuals change, usually triggered by life events such 
as the birth of a child or children leaving home. Such 
transitions usually, but not always, involve a dwelling 
change but the triggers can also be used to practical 
effect. 
This research builds on well-established patterns to 
predict the future structure of households, and hence 
dwelling needs. The Dwelling Index combines data on 
housing with demographic forecasts to predict housing 
needs, which are then compared with the dwelling stock 
to identify gaps and mismatches. 
The index can be used both retrospectively and 
prospectively. The fact that, historically, it is strongly 
correlated with house prices provides a basis for 
forecasting. This is not to say that it is sensitive to 
month-on-month changes in prices, but as a medium to 
long-term tool it appears to be very useful. 
The failure to take a holistic approach, combining 
demographic analysis with information on the housing 
stock and prices, helps to explain today’s housing crisis. 
The challenge is to switch policy from a reaction to crises 
to a rational anticipation of needs. This report proposes 
possible solutions with implications for house builders, 
government policy and financial services. 
Research aims and structure
The problems identified are deep-rooted and ongoing. 
This calls for consistent application of policies, with a 
firm evidence base, that aim to produce a better match 
between supply and demand. The research had the 
following aims:   
•	 to undertake an analysis of housing needs, taking 
into account the effects of population growth and 
ageing;
•	 to consider the effects of population ageing on 
household configuration, and the extent to which 
the housing stock is aligned with needs; 
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•	 to evaluate the links between house prices, 
population ageing and dwelling demand and show 
how future price movements might be affected by an 
ageing population; 
•	 to consider various policy levers, including taxation, 
to make more efficient use of the existing housing 
stock, including encouraging older people to 
downsize; and
•	 to explore ways in which the financial services 
industry can help people convert housing wealth 
into retirement income, or security for deferred 
insurance premiums to cover care costs in later life. 
Figure 1: Outline of methodology used in Chapters 1 and 2
UK population
1980 to 2040
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communal 
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UK Dwelling 
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The structure of the analysis in Chapters 1 and 2 
is set out in Figure 1. These are mainly concerned 
with quantifying future housing needs resulting from 
demographic change. Chapter 3 contains a detailed 
analysis of the actual housing stock in relation 
to housing needs, based on the Dwelling Index, 
accompanied by analysis of its effects on house prices. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the implications of the previous 
analysis for housing policy and practice, including 
improvements to forecasting methodology and the scope 
for targeted tax incentives. Chapter 5 is concerned with 
the role of and implications for financial services. The 
final chapter summarises the main conclusions.
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Chapter 1: 
Demographic change and   
household patterns
We need a slick and transparent statistical method 
of converting demographic changes into dwelling 
requirements – not the cumbersome and inflexible methods 
used currently4. The impact of demographic change on past 
and future housing needs can then be compared with the 
existing housing stock and trends in construction. 
A dwelling is defined as a house, flat or other place of 
residence, and a household as the people who live under 
the same roof and behind a single door, as a family or 
some other unit. A communal establishment is defined 
as providing managed residential accommodation. This 
includes hospitals, care homes, prisons, boarding schools 
and student halls of residence. 
Based on ONS data, the population in communal 
establishments totalled 1.1m and accounted for 1.8% 
of the population in 2011, the year of the last census. 
This research excludes the communal population from 
calculations estimating future housing needs. The 
population living in households, 98.2% of the UK total, 
forms the basis for all later analysis.
Since households vary in composition, size and age 
of occupant, future patterns are bound to be strongly 
influenced by demographic trends – for example, 
the tendency for older households to be smaller than 
households with young families. These trends and other 
changes in society do not occur suddenly but over decades.
This research uses the Dwelling Index to forecast 
future household requirements, based on the age of 
people living in households of different sizes. A new 
classification has been devised for different household 
types, which is set out in Chapter 2 and Appendix A. 
This classification enables us to predict the composition 
of future households and, therefore, the number and 
type of dwellings required.
 
Box 1 shows how the index works. It is defined as the 
average size of household lived in by people by single 
year of age. It shows that the average size declines with 
age – although there are bumps on the way. There are 
peaks at age 8-10 (about four people) and age 40 (just 
under 2.6), the latter preceded by a shallow trough 
at age 30. A steady decline sets in from the early 40s, 
before levelling out at slightly over 1.2 people per 
household in very old age.
 
The data on which the index is based was specially 
commissioned for this research from the ONS. It 
produced tables showing, for single year of age, the 
residential population living in 1, 2, 3…10 and 11+ 
households. Similar tables have been provided for 
households living in owner occupation, and private 
and socially rented accommodation. Although based 
on the slightly dated 2011 decennial census, this is the 
only information available at this level of granularity. 
4.  Responsibility for producing household projections was transferred from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) in 2017. In June 2018, ONS said that there was a need to improve the consistency between population and household forecasts and 
changes in methodology would be required – this work is ongoing. 
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Box 1: The Dwelling Index
The Dwelling Index is the imputed number of 
dwellings lived in by persons of a given age or 
age range in which we assume one dwelling per 
household. The number of dwellings occupied by 
people of age i living in household size n is the sum 
over all ages divided by household size n, in which i 
equals 0, 1, 2, 3…100+ and n 1, 2, 3…etc. 
The average size of household lived in by a person 
aged i is, therefore,                       . The total number 
of imputed dwellings is then the sum over all age 
groups and is given by: 
Data on the number of people aged i living in a 
household of size n was commissioned from the ONS 
and based on data from the 2011 census for England 
and Wales. By allocating one dwelling to each 
household, this produces an overall average occupancy 
of 2.36 persons per dwelling. 
The chart shows the average size of household 
occupied by persons by single year of age. A newborn, 
on average, lives in a household with 3.5 persons; this 
rises to 4 persons by age 8 before falling to 2.4 persons 
around age 30. It then rises again to 2.6 persons at age 
40 before falling to 1.2 at age 97 after which it rises 
slightly reaching 1.3 at 100+.
Dotted lines show the range of variation based on +/- 
one standard deviation (SD). The chart shows that the 
index is generally accurate to within +/-0.5 persons 
over the age range 0 to 100 years. 
Average household size by persons of a given age, from birth to 100 years
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Because owner-occupied dwellings tend to be bigger, 
they can accommodate more people and are less likely to 
be overcrowded. Latest data show that only around 1.8% 
of owner-occupied dwellings are classed as overcrowded, 
compared with 6.6% of socially rented and 5.2% of 
privately rented dwellings, meaning that there are 
systemic as well as age-related differences.
These differences are part of a long-term trend that has 
seen a reduction in overcrowding in owner-occupied 
properties and a rise in both social and privately rented 
properties. The trend probably reflects demographic 
adjustments in the owner-occupied sector resulting 
from population ageing, and supply constraints in other 
segments. 
For analytical purposes, some assumptions are made 
about living arrangements. As the population ages, for 
example, we would expect more people to live alone 
or in couple households, the so-called ‘empty nesters’. 
Holding certain assumptions constant is unavoidable 
since the census is only held once every 10 years (some 
interim adjustments are possible through the use of 
annual surveys and updates). 
In the next section, we use the Dwelling Index to 
investigate changes in household size to show how 
living arrangements have been affected by demographic 
changes. The basis for the estimates is obtained by 
applying the index in Box 1 to ONS UK 2016-based 
principal population projections.
Estimates of dwelling 
preferences by household size 
and age
Since 2000, application of the index shows that average 
household size has fallen from 2.42 in 2000 to 2.38 
in 2015 and is set to fall to 2.27 by 2040, implying an 
increase in dwelling needs irrespective of population 
growth. Together with population increases, the total 
number of households is set to increase by 32% from 
24.5m units in 2000 to 32.3m in 2040.
This compares with an 11.6% growth in the residential 
population from 63.9m to 71.4m.  Most of the growth will 
take place in the 65+ population, which is forecast to rise by 
52% to 17.4m as compared with growth rates of only 4.1% 
in the 0-19 age group and 2.3% in the 19-64 age group. 
What do these trends imply in terms of the number 
of people living in households of different sizes? The 
research applied the index to the actual and projected 
UK population figures to determine the residential 
population living in different household sizes, ranging 
from only 1 person to those with 5 or more.
Table 3 shows the population broken down by household 
size in five reference years from 2000 to 2040. Those 
living in 1-person households are projected to increase 
by around 30% from 8.5m to 11.0m between 2015 and 
2040. In contrast, the number living in larger households 
with 3 or more persons will grow at around 5%. 
Table 3: UK residential population (millions), by household size, at five reference points in time
Household 
size
2000 2015 2020 2030 2040 % change  
2015 -2040*
1 7.28 8.46 8.97 10.02 11.04 30.4
2 16.41 18.87 19.84 21.25 22.31 18.2
3 11.52 12.57 12.82 13.01 13.26 5.4
4 13.04 13.79 14.00 14.21 14.18 2.8
5+ 9.71 10.22 10.42 10.61 10.59 3.6
Total (millions) 57.95 63.92 66.04 69.10 71.37 11.6
*Because of rounding, not all the percentage changes correspond exactly to the numbers in the table
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Figures 2 (a) and (b) show the consequent change in 
the residential population living in 1, 2 and 3+ person 
households, respectively, by five-year age band using 
2015 and 2040 as the reference years. In all cases, we see 
that the number of people living in 3+ households will 
decline with age, whereas the number living in 1- and 
2-person households increases initially before declining 
at the oldest ages as people die out. 
Figure 2(a and b) Population living in 1, 2 and 3+ households in 2015 and 2040
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In 2015 (Figure 2a), for 2-person households an initial 
peak occurs in the 25-29 age brackets as people pair 
off into couples, and then declines as they become 3+ 
households by starting families. As children gradually 
leave the family home, the number of people in 2-person 
households then rises again, peaking at age 65-69.
 
The number in 3+ person households is highest at the 
lowest ages and remains fairly high until children start to 
leave home when parents are in their late 40s. In contrast, 
the number in 1-person households is non-existent until 
the late teens, after which it rises gradually through the life 
course, peaking at around age 80 and then falling.
Now compare this with figure 2(b). By 2040 the 
residential population will have grown from 63.9 to 
71.4m. The shape of both charts is similar up to a point. 
However, the main difference is the significant increases 
in the number of people living in 1- and 2-person 
households at older ages. 
Figure 3 shows that, in each of the five reference years 
from 2000 to 2040, the number of people in single-
person households is actually quite similar below age 50, 
but above that age there is huge divergence. Particularly 
noticeable is the growth after 2020, with a peak of 1.2m 
in the vulnerable age bracket 84 to 89 in 2040. 
Figure 3: Population living in 1-person households in 2015, 2020, 2030 and 2040 by 5-year age group 
The data can be broken down by occupancy type, 
which also reveals distinctive patterns over the life cycle. 
However, since occupancy type is sensitive to house prices 
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renting comprised 17.2% of occupancy types and private 
renting 19.3%. Owner occupation, by contrast, falls from 
66% (based on the 2011 census) to 61.7% in 2016.
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
0-4 5-9 10-
14
15-
19
20-
24
25-
29
30-
34
35-
39
40-
44
45-
49
50-
54
55-
59
60-
64
65-
69
70-
74
75-
79
80-
84
85-
89
90+
N
um
be
r 
of
  1
-p
er
so
n 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 (
m
ill
io
ns
) 
Age group 
1-person 2000
1-person 2015
1-person 2020
1-person 2030
1-person 2040
CSFI
CSFI  –  73 Leadenhall Market, London EC3V 1LT  –  Tel: 020 7621 1056  –  E-mail: info@csfi.org  –  Web: www.csfi.org 13
Box 2: Changes in occupancy type by single year of age
The chart shows the number of people living in each of three occupancy types by single year of age, based on 
the 2011 census. Of the 55m residential population in England and Wales, 66% lived in owner occupation, 
18% in the private rented sector and 16% in social rented accommodation. 
•	 The peak at age 65 (point A) is a legacy of the first wave of post-war baby boomers, while 45 (B) is the peak 
age for owner occupation. 
•	 Private renting takes off in the late teens as children go to university and peaks at age 25 (point C) before 
falling away gradually, slipping below social renting from age 43. 
•	 Social renting is highest at younger ages (point D). Initially it is slightly below private renting, before 
declining with age.
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Chapter 2:
Housing needs versus     
housing stock
Previous analysis has focused on the interaction between 
demographics and household size. It enabled us to 
predict a surge in the number of 1-person households 
mainly as a consequence of population ageing. However, 
dwelling requirements differ depending on household 
type. For example, space requirements for 1- or 2-adult 
family homes with children will be different from those 
of older couple households.  
While the existing housing stock serves the majority 
of housing needs, the analysis suggests that the scale 
of the mismatch is set to get worse. This means that 
fitting households more closely to dwelling needs will 
become an increasing policy challenge. In this chapter, 
we unpick these issues using novel methods to help 
inform the next generation of house building and home 
adaptations. 
To give an obvious example, there is no point in building 
executive homes if the need is for 2-bedroom apartments 
accommodating older couples or 1-bedroom apartments 
for those living alone. By matching the housing stock 
to need, we increase choice and make it easier for 
households to upsize or downsize as they wish. The 
question is how to do this in the most appropriate way. 
Our starting point is an enumeration of housing needs 
and living space requirements based on housing type. 
Using government standards for living area and 
bedrooms as a benchmark, the Dwelling Index is 
applied to determine future housing needs. The 
results are compared with the existing housing stock 
to determine the degree of alignment. Extending the 
previous analysis to household building trajectories, the 
research can quantify the increasing mismatch between 
the present housing configuration and future dwelling 
needs, based on household type and size. 
The mechanism is as follows. As average household 
size declines with the age of owner, without house 
moves the result will be a ratchet effect as dwellings 
become under-occupied. This will encroach on the 
housing needs and ambitions of younger generations, 
who will be stuck in smaller family dwellings and 
private rented accommodation. In social tenancies 
there is a much closer match between dwelling size and 
the number of occupants because allocation is on the 
basis of need.
Classifying households by type
First, households need to be classified in a manageable 
way. Mayhew and Harper (2015) set out household 
types based on the number of people per household 
and their ages, which has been adapted for this 
research5. It is a flexible classification with eight 
principal types, A to H. It includes couple households 
with or without children, single adult households with 
5.  G. Harper and L. Mayhew. Using Administrative Data to Count and Classify Households with Local Applications. August 2015 Applied Spatial Analysis and 
Policy 9(4),DOI: 10.1007/s12061-015-9162-2
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or without children, older couple or single person 
households, or three-generation households with 
one or more person from each age group. There is 
a final residual category that includes, for example, 
split generations of young children living with a 
grandparent and households with mainly students. 
Examples based on the ages and number of people in 
each household and how they are classified are shown 
in Table 4. In the analysis we include households with 
up to 10 or more people. In fact, around 92% of all 
households in 2015 contained four or fewer people but 
it is important to show needs across the spectrum. 
Table 4: Specific examples of households defined by size and age group 
(Key: o indicates a person)
Type
age 
group
1
age 
group
2
age 
group
3
size Description
A OO-- OO ---- 4 Couple household with two children
B -O-- O--- ---- 2 Single adult household with one child
C ---- O--- O--- 2 Older couple household with one person aged 65+
D ---- ---- O--- 1 Older person living alone
E --O- OO-- O--- 4 3-generational with one child, couple and an older person
F ---- OOO- ---- 3 Cohabiting adult household
G ---- O--- ---- 1 Adult living alone
H OO-- OO-- 4 Split generation household
H' OOOO ---- ---- 4 Young household (e.g. students, teenage parent)
Type A
Family 
household with 
children
2 adults and  
1+ children
2+ adults and 
1+ children
Type B
Single adult 
with children
1 adult and 
1+ children
Type C
Older 
cohabiting  
couple +
At least 2 
adults with 
one  or 
more aged 
65+ and no 
children
Type D
Older person 
living alone
Person 
aged 65+ 
living 
alone
Type E
Three 
generational 
household
At least one 
person 
aged 0-19,  
one  aged 
20-64, and 
one aged 
65+
Type F
Cohabiting 
adult 
household
Adult 
household 
with 2+ 
adults aged 
20-64
Type G
Adult living 
alone
One adult 
aged 
20-64 
living 
alone
Type H
Other 
households
Skipped 
generational 
households 
with older 
person and 
children
Households 
with nobody  
aged 20+
e.g.
student 
household, 
teenage 
couple
Anomalous 
households
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Potentially hundreds of different combinations of people 
and ages may constitute a household, but certain types 
are far more common. In practice, we worked with 286 
mutually exclusive types with occupancy levels of up 
to 10 people, and with one residual category for 11+ 
occupants (see Appendix A). 
We commissioned data from the ONS showing the 
actual number of people living in households of different 
sizes and three age brackets: 0-19, 20-64 and 65+. 
Estimates of housing needs by 
household type: 2000 to 2040
In the previous analysis we estimated the number of 
people living in households of different sizes as far ahead 
as 2040. While we know how many of such households 
there are, we do not know what type they are. For example, 
a household with three occupants could be a couple 
with one child, a single parent with two children, three 
cohabitating adults sharing a flat, or a household with at 
least one person aged 65+. We used ONS data to split 
occupancy levels into one of the eight household types.
There are two main assumptions. The first is that the 
Dwelling Index is a reasonable representation of average 
living arrangements based on household occupancy 
data. Put simply, children will continue to live with their 
parents, adults will tend to live in family households, 
or cohabit with other adults or live alone, while older 
people will generally live in couples or alone. As the 
population ages, we would expect the number in each 
type to adjust. For example, there will be more couple- 
and single-person households comprising older people. 
The second assumption is that the probability of living 
in one of the mutually exclusive household arrangements 
will stay broadly the same. This means that we do not 
anticipate a reversion to three-generation households or 
a big shift to communal living. The latter is, however, 
a possible outcome if the number of old people living 
alone were to be regarded as a systemic problem and the 
policy response was to build more communal facilities, 
in which case the model would need to be adapted. 
Estimates for the number of households by type for 
each reference year are given in Table 5. This shows 
a 17% overall rise from 2015 to 2040, from 27.6m 
dwelling units to 32.3m., as compared with a 12.5% 
rise from 2000 to 2015. Note the great variation in 
terms of future living arrangements based on changes 
in household mix. 
While type A family households will remain the most 
numerous, their number will tend to level out at 
around 6.5m. Type B single-adult households, also with 
children, are set to increase in number but not by as 
much as other types. Together, households with children 
will account for a decreasing share of all households from 
30% in 2005 to 27% in 2040.
Most dramatic is the predicted increase in the number 
of older people living alone (type D), which is expected 
to rise by 30.4% from 2015 to 2040 to 4.5m. The 
number of older households with two or more people 
(type C) is forecast to increase by 16.2% to 4.7m. 
Also noteworthy is predicted growth of 30.4% in the 
working age population living alone (type G) to 6.4m.
Due to population growth from 2015 to 2040, none of 
the types will actually experience a numerical decrease. 
In other words, the number of households will increase 
faster, at 17.0%, than the population, which is forecast 
to expand by 11.6%. The key implication is that 
households will continue to decline in size and average 
occupancy per dwelling will continue to fall.
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Table 5: Estimates of housing needs by household type 2000 to 2040 by number of dwelling units 
(millions) 
Category 2000 2015 2020 2030 2040 % change 2000 to 
2015*
% change 2015 to 
2040*
A 5.88 6.28 6.39 6.49 6.52 6.7 3.8
B 1.75 1.96 2.02 2.12 2.18 11.5 11.2
C 3.58 4.09 4.28 4.54 4.75 14.0 16.2
D 2.99 3.48 3.69 4.12 4.54 16.3 30.4
E 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 6.3 5.3
F 5.77 6.53 6.81 7.20 7.49 13.1 14.7
G 4.24 4.94 5.23 5.85 6.44 16.3 30.4
H 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.16 8.3 20.4
Total 24.52 27.58 28.62 30.66 32.27 12.5 17.0
*Because of rounding, not all the percentage changes correspond exactly to the numbers in the table.
Table 6: Living area based on bedroom count, adapted from government dwelling space 
standards in square metres (upper, lower and midpoint) for households with 
1, 2 or 3 bedrooms
Average bedrooms 
per household
Lower 
(sq metres)
Upper 
(sq metres)
Mid-point 
(sq metres)
1 39 58 48.5
2 61 79 70
3 74 108 91
Comparison of household 
composition and dwelling size
By associating each household type with an average number 
of bedrooms, and occupancy levels with government space 
standards, it is possible to estimate housing requirements 
by property size. However, there is some arbitrariness about 
how dwelling size should be measured. In the UK, house 
size is conventionally based on the number of bedrooms, 
whereas in other countries it is expressed in square metres. 
Findings in this research are based on technical standards 
published by the Department for Communities and 
Local Government (now the Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government). The standards 
vary slightly according to the number of storeys in a 
property to allow for staircases and storage. This table 
compares bedroom and space requirements per dwelling, 
in which the midpoint in square metres is used as our 
benchmark (see final column of Table 6).
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If space requirements are measured in bedrooms, there 
is a debate about how many are needed per household 
type. Under local housing allowance rules, household 
size and the age and sex of dependants determine how 
many bedrooms are needed, with exemptions for disabled 
people, and this extends to housing benefit rules. 
As a rule of thumb, it is uncontentious to say that typical 
young families need three or more bedrooms, but how 
many do, say, an older couple need? Consider a couple 
who decide to move from a house to an apartment 
because it is easier to maintain and safer to grow old 
in. We might assume one bedroom is enough, but two 
would accommodate a live-in carer, while three would 
allow for family visits. 
For illustrative purposes, we will assume that types A, 
B, C, E and H households have 3+ bedrooms, types 
D and F two bedrooms and type G one bedroom, on 
average. We apply these averages to future housing needs 
(from the previous section) to produce a breakdown by 
bedrooms and space requirements.
The results are given in Table 7 and sum to the total 
dwellings given in Table 5, but now the number of 
dwellings is split by bedrooms and space requirements. 
It shows that dwelling demand based on future 
household arrangements is set to increase by 1.5m 
single-bedroom dwellings between 2015 and 2040, 
2m two-bedroom dwellings and 1.2m 3+ bedroom 
dwellings (4.7m in total). 
Table 7: Dwelling stock requirement and living area in square metres based on average bedrooms 
per household (millions) showing uplift needed 2015-2040
Average 
bedrooms per 
household
2000 2015 2020 2030 2040 New stock 
required
(m)
Floor area 
required
(m sq ms)
1 4.24 4.94 5.23 5.85 6.44 1.5 72.8
2 8.76 10.01 10.50 11.32 12.03 2.0 141.4
3+ 11.52 12.64 12.89 13.49 13.81 1.2 106.2
Total 24.52 27.58 28.62 30.66 32.27 4.7 320.4
How does this match up with the present housing stock? 
The total net additional space requirement between 
2015 and 2040 is 320.4m square metres. To put a rough 
scale on this, it would equate to building two new towns 
of 100,000 dwellings every year for 25 years. 
This uses average floor space based on the mid-point in 
the final column of  Table 6.  However, a major issue for 
older people is that many modern apartments are built to 
the smallest space standards and situated in tower blocks 
in urban areas, and so are not suitable for older living. 
We attribute this to the business model used by 
developers which caters for young urban professionals 
who are out at work or enjoying urban life for 
most of the day. Future demand will, however, be 
demographically driven by older people with very 
different lifestyles and living requirements. 
Comparison of estimates with 
actual dwelling stock 
The Valuation Agency provides a comprehensive 
breakdown by age, property type and bedroom for 24m 
properties in England and Wales for 2015. Local authorities 
publish similar breakdowns by number of bedrooms for 
their 1.6m stock (also England and Wales). Valuation 
Agency data show that two thirds of domestic properties are 
houses of two or more storeys (terraced, semis, or detached), 
10% are bungalows and 22% apartments. Of these, 60% 
have three or more bedrooms. Local authority data, in 
contrast, show that their dwellings are split into roughly 
equal proportions of 1, 2 and 3+ bedroom units. 
Although 60% of all properties have 3 bedrooms or 
more, this applies to less than 2.1% of all apartments. In 
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Table 8: Percentage breakdown of bedroom capacity in the all-dwelling and local authority 
sectors in 2015, compared with requirements in the Dwelling Index*
Bedrooms per household Actual all dwellings Local authority dwellings Dwelling index
1 11.7 31.3 17.9
2 28.3 33.5 36.3
3+ 60.0 35.2 45.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
*based on given assumptions about household type and bedroom needs
other words, the scope for older couples to move from 
a typical 3-bedroom property to a 3-bedroom modern 
serviced apartment is likely to be extremely limited, 
even if this is an attractive option. Bungalows, which are 
popular with older couples, are even scarcer especially in 
cities where land values are higher.
Downsizing to a 1- or 2-bedroom apartment is easier, 
but flats of an appropriate quality and size are scarce 
compared with the availability of houses. The net 
effect of this is to deter people from moving into 
more manageable properties as they grow older – for 
example, with shared management, communal gardens, 
underground parking, lifts and a concierge6.
Table 8 compares the assessment of housing needs in 2015 
contained in Table 7 with the two previously mentioned 
benchmarks. The figures are expressed as a percentage 
of all dwellings based on Valuation Agency data, local 
authority data and our own breakdown of bedroom needs. 
The Dwelling Index falls between the two benchmarks. 
In local authorities, the percentage of dwellings with 1, 
2 or 3 bedrooms tends to be a good fit with household 
profiles, taking a strict view based on tight specifications 
for bedroom requirements.
Using a more generous allocation of bedrooms, our findings 
suggest a need for 45.8% of all properties to have 3 or more 
bedrooms. This compares with 60% of current properties. 
To put this result differently, the average person is over-
bedroomed compared with their needs. This argues for a 
diminishing share of 3-bedroom accommodation and an 
increasing share of 1- and 2-bedroom accommodation. 
These assessments concur with the actual composition 
of new homes built since 2005. A recent analysis by 
parliament found that 44% of new builds were flats 
compared with 18% of existing stock, with 2-bedroom 
dwellings accounting for 40% of new builds and 3 or more 
bedroom properties for 44% of the total7. The principal 
problem is that there has not been enough building in total.
To summarise, this chapter has revealed that the 
mismatch between dwelling use and dwelling needs 
will grow. This not a gap that can be closed overnight, 
but it could be managed with housing policies that 
encourage people to downsize and developers to build 
appropriately. These are areas to target when framing 
future housing policy, assessing local plans and judging 
whether existing policies are fit for purpose.   
6.  Ideas on these lines are not new. See, for example, Best and Porteus (2012) Housing our Ageing Population: Plan for implementation.  https://www.housinglin.
org.uk/_assets/Resources/Housing/Support_materials/Other_reports_and_guidance/Housing_our_Ageing_Population_Plan_for_Implementation.pdf
7.  Tackling the under-supply of housing in England, by Wilson and Barton. Briefing paper Number 07671, 3 September 2018. House of Commons Library. 
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Chapter 3: 
The Dwelling Index       
and house prices 
The scale of change in housing need suggests an 
immediate requirement of at least 220,000 extra 
dwellings per annum for the next few years. This 
compares with annual average increases in the housing 
stock of 200,000 per year, implying an ever-widening 
gap between supply and demand. The paradox is that 
since 1993, according to the Dwelling Index, the actual 
UK housing stock has exceeded ‘need’. 
This also makes the steep rise in house prices more 
puzzling – something else must be going on. One 
explanation is that population ageing has led to 
increasingly under-occupied properties. The average 
number of occupants per dwelling has fallen from 2.48 in 
1980 to 2.36 in 2018. If occupancy today were the same 
as in 1980, there would be 1.3m more dwellings available.
Other contributory factors include the emergence 
of second homes and population growth – especially 
immigration – which have fuelled demand. In this 
chapter, we analyse the relationship between housing 
supply, housing needs and house prices. Bear in mind 
that understanding changes in prices is as much an art as 
a science – especially in the short run. 
Historically, the best predictor of house prices was average 
earnings, but as prices have surged ahead of earnings this 
no longer provides a viable basis. Other variables have 
come into play making forecasting models more complex, 
which brings its own problems. An example is the one 
used by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)8. 
It is noteworthy that demographic change is given short 
shrift in this and similar models, even though it is a 
crucial driver of housing needs. Our own work using 
a basket of variables, such as earnings, interest rates, 
housing supply, tax policy and foreign investment, 
produces an improved predictive model, but it does not 
reproduce short-run fluctuations very well. 
Even if it did, there are other problems with using economic 
variables. Take interest rates, which are historically low. 
These work with other policy tools, such as quantitative 
easing, to inject liquidity into the economy. To be able to 
predict changes to house prices, one must consider not only 
their effects on prices, but also externally driven variables 
whose future values are not easily determined. 
It turns out that the Dwelling Index is able to reproduce 
historical changes in house prices quite accurately. It 
is also relatively easy to use to forecast decades ahead 
and so better suited to long-term planning. However, 
it is not ideal for short-term use because the necessary 
demographic data are published infrequently, whereas 
prices are constantly evolving. 
Changes in supply and 
demand since 1980
The 1980s were unusual because baby boomers were 
turning 30 and so housing demand would have been 
8.  Working paper No.6 Forecasting house prices, Toby Auterson, Office for Budget Responsibility. July 2014
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exceptionally high. House prices rose accordingly. High 
borrowing rates made home ownership increasingly 
expensive, although the ‘Right to Buy’ scheme softened 
the cost of house purchase for council tenants. 
This period coincided with a housing boom in which 
the stock expanded on average by about 200,000 a year 
– the long-run rate – or twice the rate of growth in the 
Dwelling Index, our proxy for demand. Oversupply 
caused the housing market to crash in the early 1990s. 
Figure 4 shows the year-on-year percentage change in 
the housing stock and Dwelling Index and indicates the 
seeds of today’s housing crisis. It identifies four phases 
between 1980 and the present:
a. 1981 to 1991 in which the stock grew faster than 
the Dwelling Index before the housing crash in 
1991; 
b. 1991 to the next (smaller) crash in 2001 in which 
the growth in stock reverted to below 1981 levels; 
c. 2001 to 2008 in which the Dwelling Index grew much 
more rapidly than the stock and corresponded with a 
period of high immigration and increasing prices; and
d. 2008 to the present in which the rate of growth in 
the Dwelling index has generally outstripped the 
rate of growth in the stock, corresponding with the 
aftermath of the financial crisis.
In general, house building moves up and down over the 
business cycle rather than with demand, which is smoother. 
The data show cyclical downturns in house building in 
1980, 1991, 2001 and 2012, all business recessions. In 
contrast, increases in demand for housing are both smoother 
and steadier and, therefore, more predictable. The cyclical 
nature of construction is one reason why building activity 
has not stemmed prices. Construction lagged further behind 
demand after the financial crisis, and although it has since 
picked up, it is still below required levels. 
It is important to note that because new houses are sold 
at a premium, they can actually worsen the problem 
they are intended to alleviate i.e. high house prices. To 
counter this effect, houses need to be built in sufficient 
numbers at a smaller size and at prices that first-time 
buyers, in particular, can afford. 
The UK housing stock today stands at 28.3m units, 
having increased by 31% since 1980. This equates to 
a current ‘surplus’ of 0.8m dwellings compared with 
Figure 4: Changes in year-on-year rates of growth in the housing stock and Dwelling Index from 1980 
to 2020 
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9.  Homes sweet homes – the rise of multiple property ownership in Britain (August 2017). Housing, wealth and debt, intergenerational commission, The 
Resolution Foundation https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/media/blog/homes-sweet-homes-the-rise-of-multiple-property-ownership-in-britain/
10. Filipa Sá. The Effect of Foreign Investors on Local Housing Markets: Evidence from the UK. School of Management & Business, King’s College London
11.  In April 2018 the Ministry of Housing. Communities and Local Government cited an effect of around 20% using a different approach but said this result was based 
on a model originally developed in 2007 and so should be treated with caution. https://fullfact.org/immigration/have-house-prices-risen-because-immigrants/
the Dwelling Index. A key reason for this has been the 
growth in second homes, linked to the baby boomer 
generation, which has benefited from rising property 
values and parental legacies9. 
Foreign investment in UK property also increased 
significantly. Filipa Sá (2016)10 found that foreign 
investment in expensive homes increased house prices in 
London considerably. She argues that not only did it drive 
up top-end prices, it had a ‘trickle down’ effect on the rest 
of the market, leading to lower home ownership rates.
The growth in private renting can be considered a by-
product, as renting became cheaper relative to owning. 
Even so, the cost of private renting has been fuelled by the 
effects of immigration. Immigration slowly took off in the 
early 1990s and surged after 2000, adding an estimated 
4.8 million people to the UK population since 1980.  
The question addressed here is to what extent these changes 
could have been predicted at the outset and, if so, what do 
they tell us about the future prices changes resulting from 
demographic ageing and other population fluxes.
Dwelling Index and average UK 
house prices
Economic theory predicts a fall in house prices as retirees 
downsize to help pay for their retirement through asset 
decumulation. Research in several countries has found 
that prices tend to fall in line with decreases in the 
dependency ratio of people of working age to those aged 
65+ – perhaps by as much as 25%. 
In the UK, the dependency ratio has fallen steeply from 3.8 
in 2007 to 3.3 today and is set to fall to 2.4 by 2030. There 
is no strong evidence of general price falls in the UK yet, 
although average prices have levelled out and there is regional 
variation – notably prices have started to fall in London.   
A simple analogy is with a revolving door – as people 
die their assets pass to the next generation. Increases in 
life expectancy tend to defer the transfer of assets and so 
bolster prices. The same effect occurs with increases in the 
Dwelling Index due to higher birth rates or immigration. 
With the first of the baby boomers reaching 80 from 2026, 
annual deaths are set to increase, which should release a lot of 
properties. The ONS forecasts that the number of deaths at 
ages 85+ will rise from 210,000 per year in 2020 to 336,000 
by 2040, potentially freeing up considerable housing stock. 
After testing several formulations, we found that the 
model that best replicates historical house prices results 
from splitting the Dwelling Index into three or four age 
groups. In two of the variants, we based model A on age 
groups 0-19, 20-64 and 65+; in model B, we further 
split the 65+ age group into 65-84 and 85+.
Using either model, we are able to statistically account 
for over 98% of the variation in average UK house prices 
between 1980 and 2017. We found that house prices are 
proportional to the difference in growth rates between the 
Dwelling Index and the stock. The main upward driver of 
house prices throughout this period was the 20-64 age group 
since it was the largest and had the greatest purchasing power. 
Figure 5 shows the actual and predicted index of house 
prices based on the Dwelling Index, using a multiple 
regression model. Since 1980 actual prices have risen 12-
fold, a pattern the model is able to replicate reasonably 
accurately. The rupturing of the link between earnings 
growth and prices after 2000 is considered to be one of 
the keys to the housing crisis.
To estimate the effect of immigration on prices, we 
recalculated the Dwelling Index by subtracting net 
immigration from 1980. The results suggested that 
house prices would have been around 6.0% lower on 
average over the period as a whole, but 12% lower after 
2000 after which immigration rapidly expanded11.
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Looking ahead, population projections show that dwelling 
demand in the 20-64 and 0-19 age groups will level out, 
leading to reduced housing pressure from these age groups. 
Instead price momentum will increasingly be dictated by 
the dwelling needs of the older population, the only one of 
the three age groups set to grow significantly after 2020. 
The chart contains a trajectory for future house prices 
based on models A and B. The results point to a fall 
in average house prices after 2022 (in fact, any model 
including a variable for older age does this). This 
prediction is contingent on the persistence of this 
relationship – it is not a cast-iron certainty. 
Figure 5: Chart showing the actual movement in house prices and the trend predicted by the 
Dwelling Index 1980 to the present, alongside earnings (1980 = 100) 
To summarise, our forecasts show that changes in the 
Dwelling Index will exert downward pressure on house 
prices in the 2020s, so that they fall back into line with 
earnings. In model A, prices will peak in 2023 and fall to 
75% of their value by 2030; in model B they peak in 2020 
and fall to 62% of their value by 2030. This does not seem 
unreasonable, especially if earnings are not keeping pace. 
Dwelling Index and other 
occupancy types
As the availability of social housing has declined, 
private renting has become a substitute. Demand for 
private renting has increased in line with higher student 
numbers, a key market for private landlords, and also with 
immigration. Student renting tends to be short-term, but 
immigrants are likely to be older and rent for longer. 
The data show that in 1980, 55% of dwellings were 
owner-occupied, 33% socially rented and 11% private 
rented. In 2015, only 17% were socially rented, while 
private renting had grown to 19% and owner occupation 
to 62%. The general effect of a tightening housing 
market has been to increase rents relative to earnings, 
making it more difficult for first-time buyers to save and 
so afford to buy their own homes. 
The relationship of private renting with house prices is 
important: private landlords buy up stock, which pushes 
up both house prices and rent. Private renting has also 
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increased the cost of housing benefit, which subsidises 
rents. This was part of a conscious decision taken in 
the 1970s to move away from investment in bricks 
and mortar, i.e. building council homes, to focus on 
subsidies for individuals, as a step towards them buying 
their own homes.
The shift towards private renting has had repercussions 
for the quality of the housing stock. For example, a 
much larger percentage of private rented housing is 
classified as ‘non-decent’ as compared with socially 
rented or owner-occupied dwellings, although data show 
that better regulation has caused the percentage of non-
decent private rented stock to fall.
Putting these details to one side, what are the prospects 
of the private rented sector following the predicted 
price falls of this research? We find a statistical 
correlation between the percentage of private rented 
accommodation and the ratio of house prices to 
earnings. The results suggest that a fall in house prices 
will result in a levelling out in the proportion of housing 
that is privately rented, and in rent rises.
The prospects for private renting will also hinge on 
whether more socially rented housing is built to meet 
the shortages in affordable housing. This is a political 
choice with, for example, the Labour Party promising 
to build 100,000 council or housing association homes 
a year for ‘genuinely affordable rent or sale’. 
The Conservatives have also revised their thinking and 
refer to building a new generation of ‘council homes’ 
in England. There is also a social housing revival in 
Scotland. But in all cases the small print is unclear 
– particularly the balance between ownership and 
affordable rents, and the financial rules under which 
schemes will operate.  
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Chapter 4: 
Effects of population ageing    
on housing policy and practice 
This research has found that building more homes is 
not an adequate response to the UK’s housing crisis. 
More measures are needed to address the under-
occupancy of an increasing number of dwellings and 
the unaffordability of homes for first-time buyers. 
The central paradox underpinning this conclusion is 
that the housing stock, on paper at least, is more than 
sufficient to meet current housing needs.
However, the second paradox is that house prices are 
relatively inelastic to increases in the construction of 
new houses, in part because they are more expensive 
than existing ones. They also appear to be driven by 
other factors, one of which is inertia – it is as though 
the older generation is engaged in an involuntary 
hoarding of wealth, keeping prices at unaffordable 
levels.
 
Demographically speaking, we have entered a different 
phase in which housing needs are changing due to the 
ageing population. Chapter one showed that there will 
be a 30.4% rise in the number of older people living 
alone, from 8.5m in 2015 to 11m in 2040. Of these, 
1.9m will be aged 85+, over twice the level in 2015.
Just as there are initiatives to help ‘first-time buyers’, 
the policy suggestions set out in this chapter can be 
characterised as help for ‘last-time buyers’. The aim is 
to align buyers’ interests to encourage what might be 
called ‘right sizing’ but effectively means ‘downsizing’ 
with additional refinements12. 
Collectively, these initiatives should pull in the same 
direction, effectively creating a national strategy for 
older people's housing13. The components range from 
building more homes for downsizers, financial incentives 
to reduce the cost of moving and, at the macro level, 
better planning and delivery, and a rebalancing of 
regional differences. This chapter highlights four policy 
enablers: building more affordable homes, building more 
retirement homes, tax policy and planning.
Building more affordable 
homes
The affordable homes programme marks a shift in 
government thinking to providing subsidies to house 
builders as well as to purchasers – whether for owning 
or renting. The programme is not without its problems. 
Announced in 2014, it is difficult to track due to the 
nature of the ad hoc and time-limited funding streams, 
each with varying eligibility criteria. 
12.  Rightsizing: Reframing the housing offer for older people. University of Manchester, School of Architecture. https://www.housinglin.org.uk/News/Rightsizing-
Report-Reframing-the-housing-offer-for-older-people/
13.  Housing for older people. Second Report of Session 2017–19. House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee. Housing for older people. 
Second Report of Session 2017–19. House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee. https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/
committees-a-z/commons-select/communities-and-local-government-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/housing-for-older-people-17-19/
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The concept of affordability is ambiguous, with numerous 
definitions. This means that statistics on the number of 
affordable homes constructed are easily manipulated14. 
A criterion based on sale price as a multiple of household 
income, adjusted by a local market factor, would be a 
better approach (ditto private and social renting). The 
best way to judge the effect of the programme is to look 
at overall construction statistics which, despite recent 
rises, still show a significant shortfall relative to past 
achievements, alongside a decline in home ownership and 
rise in private renting.  
The majority of schemes supporting house buyers 
(rather than builders) come in the form of subsidies to 
purchasers or renters and are not directly construction-
related. They tend to ease the cost of house purchase 
without reducing house prices – indeed, in some cases, 
they may actually serve to increase prices. 
Of the schemes listed in Box 3, the longest running 
and most significant is ‘Right to Buy’, but its impact 
has dwindled as council homes are sold off. The critical 
point from a supply perspective is that local councils 
have not been allowed to replace the homes sold, so 
there is no net addition and fewer available for sale. 
This has reduced the supply of homes to young families 
and more generally postponed family formation. The 
government has now recognised the futility of this, 
lifting the borrowing cap on local authorities to enable 
them to build more homes. 
Box 3:  Government schemes supporting home ownership
•	 Right to buy or acquire: ‘Right to Buy’ has been around since 1980. It allows tenants to buy their home 
from their local council at a discount. ‘Right to Acquire’ is a similar scheme for registered providers of social 
housing. Currently sales of council homes are running at around 23,000 dwelling units a year (worth about 
£1bn). This compares with 150,000 a year in the early 80s. 
•	 Help to buy (equity loan scheme): Prospective home owners, putting down a 5% deposit, can borrow 
20% (up to 40% in London) from the government towards the cost of a new-build property, up to a value 
of £600.000, with nothing to pay on the loan for five years. Help to Buy has been very effective, with 
170,000 new homes since 2013, or 81%, sold to first-time buyers.
 
•	 Shared Ownership: This allows first-time buyers and those unable to afford open market prices to purchase 
a 25% to 75% share of a newly built home or an existing one through a resale programme. Rent is paid on 
the remaining share. We can find no coherent time series to show how well this scheme is performing but 
estimates are for 41,000 homes.  
•	 Starter Homes: The aim of the programme, first announced in 2014, is to provide 200,000 affordable 
homes by 2020 to be sold at a 20% discount. Buyers must live in the property for at least five years. Again, 
there are no coherent statistics on how many have been built or even if any have been built.
•	 Help to Buy ISA: This tax-free savings account was launched at the end of 2015. The government adds a 
25% bonus up to £3,000 on purchase of a first home. This is one of two examples linked to helping first-
time buyers to save for a deposit. While the scheme is welcome, the danger is that by the time savers are 
ready to buy, prices have increased. 
•	 Lifetime ISA: ‘LISAs’ are savings accounts introduced from April 2017 as a way to help those aged 18-40 
save for a home or retirement. The limit is £4,000 a year and any money put in the account will be boosted 
by a 25% government bonus. Similar arguments apply as for Help to Buy ISAs.
14.  Briefing Paper Number 07747, 21 September 2018.What is affordable housing? W. Wilson and C. Barton. House of Commons Library. 
 https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7747#fullreport
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Perhaps the salient point is not whether the schemes 
are worthwhile, but that it is difficult to monitor the 
programme in its entirety, other than to say it is not 
doing enough to solve the housing shortage. The 
Chartered Institute for Housing does a remarkable job in 
piecing together data from across the UK and its annual 
review is the most comprehensive analysis available of 
the UK housing market15.  
It shows that planned government support for 
affordable and private market housing investment in 
England from 2016-17 to 2020-21 is £19.4bn, but 
this needs to be backed up with out-turn data from 
the inception of each scheme. The fact that the review 
is published by an independent body rather than by 
the government illustrates a lack of oversight and what 
might be called ‘whole systems thinking’. 
It is notable that housing benefit, which makes rents 
more affordable, is not considered alongside these 
schemes, even though it costs over £25bn a year. The 
bill is increasing because more people are living in 
private rented accommodation where rents are higher. 
The obvious solution is to build more social housing. 
An improved monitoring system would cover 
government subsidies to both the supply and demand 
sides. A comprehensive set of accounts should be 
published showing the number of homes built and 
sold under each development programme. This would 
include the cost of subsidies to purchasers and savers, as 
well as housing benefit and the tax-take across the piece 
– all in one place. 
A final important point is that current schemes are 
aimed primarily at people trying to get onto the housing 
ladder, rather than doing something for ‘last-time 
buyers’. Yet this is where the blockages in the housing 
pipeline are increasingly occurring. Tackling this issue 
should be hoisted much higher up the housing policy 
agenda. 
Building more retirement 
homes
The housing needs of the older population clearly 
deserve more attention. Although many older people live 
in suitable accommodation, needs can change rapidly 
and large numbers live alone in properties that are not 
designed for older living and/or are too large for their 
requirements. 
Moving into more suitable accommodation would 
increase their quality of life and have a ripple effect 
through the market by releasing stock. This could 
be better managed using forethought and targeted 
incentives. For example, downsizing options around 
the time of retirement differ from options at, say, 80 
because the motivational triggers and housing solutions 
are different. 
Research by the Institute of Fiscal Studies finds that 
downsizing around retirement age is still relatively 
unusual, but is slightly more likely for people in their 
50s and 60s than for those in their late 60s or 70s. 
Moving at older ages is usually triggered by other factors 
such as the death of a partner, an inability to cope or a 
need to release cash to pay for care.
A key factor for potential downsizers around the 
time of retirement is the shortage of suitably sized 
accommodation, especially apartments. Room sizes are 
often too small compared with what they are used to. 
One or two bedrooms is the norm when three would 
be preferable to accommodate family visits or a live-in 
carer. 
That downsizing is not straightforward is also evident 
from council tax data. Property tax bands range from A 
to H in the UK (Northern Ireland excepted) depending 
on the value of the property, with band A houses being 
the smallest in size.
15.  See Chartered Institute of Housing UK Housing Review 2018  http://www.cih.org/publication/display/vpathDCR/templatedata/cih/publication/data/UK_
Housing_Review_2018 and also data sources at https://www.ukhousingreview.org.uk/ukhr18/compendium.html#macroeconomy
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Bands A to C account for about 80% of all properties, but 
with much fewer band A than band B properties there is 
little to downsize to. This may mean moving out of the area 
to find a property that is both suitable and affordable. One 
way to address this problem is to build more retirement 
homes, including in purpose designed communities. 
Property specialist Knight Frank notes that there are only 
725,000 retirement housing units across the UK16. With 
28 million homes in total, this means that retirement 
housing accounts for around 2.6% of homes and, of this, 
private retirement housing units (162,000) account for a 
tiny 0.6% of stock. 
Despite their small number, purpose-built retirement 
homes are growing in popularity. There are different 
types, but a broad distinction can be drawn between 
those that offer care or not. For example, ‘extra care’ 
specialist housing is designed for people from around age 
60. It is similar to sheltered housing but also offers help 
with personal care and household chores.
One option is to move into a retirement community 
with a mix of ages, offering services and social amenities 
in situ and the opportunity to step up to nursing care 
when necessary. It has been shown that retirement 
communities help to improve health, combat loneliness 
and even increase life expectancy17. However, as Knight 
Frank has found, there are not enough of them.  
Modern retirement communities are built to a high 
specification, designed to be thermally efficient with low 
running costs and in attractive surroundings. Resident ages 
start at around 65 with a range of property types available. 
The key to their success is the financial arrangements, 
which need to be affordable and adaptable so that 
individuals are not forced to move on for financial reasons.
Several models are available to finance retirement living, 
ranging from outright ownership to renting and part 
exchange, in which the provider purchases a home in 
exchange for alternative accommodation avoiding the 
hassle of a housing chain. 
Tax policy
Given that downsizing is still relatively rare, despite the 
number of older people living alone in large properties, 
it is surprising that more use is not being made of 
the tax system to encourage change. Indeed, there is 
a growing consensus that current tax policies make it 
more expensive to downsize or give up surplus or empty 
accommodation than to stay put. 
Many will have extended their homes as an alternative to 
upsizing because of the cost of moving, diverting resources 
from house building into home extensions. Of course, 
the results can be spectacular, but the key point is that, 
coupled with high moving costs, it adds to the inertia.
 
This is a complex area of policy, but relevant taxes are 
council tax, stamp duty, inheritance tax and capital gains 
tax. While some of the suggestions below have been 
foreshadowed elsewhere, the aim of this section is to 
consider them as a whole. 
Take council tax, which is levied to pay for local services such 
as social care, rubbish collection and street maintenance. 
Councils have discretion over whether to apply discounts to 
empty and second homes. In localities with high housing 
needs and high proportions of vacant or second homes, it 
would make sense to remove the discounts. 
Yet when it comes to levying capital gains tax on the 
sale of second properties, there is a case for tax breaks to 
encourage their release – for instance, if they were sold to 
first-time buyers. One way to do this would be to extend 
capital gains allowances based on buyer profile. 
Stamp duty for standard purchases is levied on every 
transaction of more than £125,000, with rates rising 
from 2% to 12%, according to the price band. For buy-
to-let and second homes, stamp duty surcharges apply. 
The tax kicks in at 3% for purchases up to £125,000 
and rises to 15% following the same band structure as 
for standard purchases. 
16.  Retirement housing market update Q1 2018. Knight Frank. https://content.knightfrank.com/research/696/documents/en/uk-retirement-housing-market-
update-q1-2018-5284.pdf
17.  Does living in a retirement village extend life expectancy? The case of Whiteley Village. L. Mayhew, D. Smith, and B. Rickayzen. ILC-UK. https://ilcuk.org.uk/does-
living-in-a-retirement-village-extend-life-expectancy-the-case-of-whiteley-village/
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18.  Scanlon, K, C. Whitehead and F. Blanc. A taxing question:  Is Stamp Duty Land Tax suffocating the English housing market. LSE. http://www.lse.ac.uk/business-
and-consultancy/consulting/assets/documents/is-stamp-duty-land-tax-suffocating-the-english-housing-market.pdf
19.  2017. ‘Fixing our broken housing market’. Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
ministry-of-housing-communities-and-local-government
20.  Tackling the under-supply of housing in England, by Wilson and Barton. Briefing paper
 Number 07671, 3 September 2018. House of Commons Library. https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7671
For first-time buyers there are stamp duty exemptions up 
to a point, but the tiering of the duty means far higher 
charges for more expensive homes. While the overall 
effect has been to increase tax revenues, the data show 
that it reduces the number of transactions. Its impact 
on larger homes, typically owned and occupied by older 
residents, is bound to deter downsizing18.
It is the scale of charges that is eye-watering. On a typical 
property costing £300,000, stamp duty is only £5,000 
(zero if a first-time buyer). However, retirees wishing 
to downsize may face prices of £800,000 or more for a 
3-bedroom apartment in a popular area. Stamp duty in 
this case would be £30,000, which would deter many 
and increase inertia. Older people are emotionally 
attached to their homes and such barriers will only 
entrench this feeling.
Equity released by downsizing can be re-invested, used to 
pay for lifestyle improvements, or gifted to descendants. 
The estate will be smaller on death as a result and so 
there will be less inheritance tax to pay. Again, however, 
high stamp duty makes this option much less attractive 
as worked examples tend to show. 
Much depends on the particular objectives of individual 
households – whether to gift wealth to descendants now 
or to bequeath it later. The danger is that, by holding 
onto a property until death, a sale is delayed perhaps 
20 years or more, which means fewer homes become 
available and eventual beneficiaries skip a generation. 
The net result is a perpetuation of under-occupation 
by tipping the balance in favour of staying put. One-
off stamp duty breaks for ‘last-time buyers’ could help 
change this and encourage more downsizing at earlier 
ages, rather than forced sales on death or transfer to care, 
especially if the original property could be sold to a first-
time buyer or young family.
Better planning and delivery 
Previous analysis suggested there would be a need to 
build two new towns of 100,000 dwellings every year 
for 25 years. Other estimates put the requirement 
even higher in the near term. One of the difficulties is 
that housing policy remains a devolved function, and 
arrangements and outcomes differ by area. 
A national policy would help, especially as the 
government’s housing white paper, published in 201719, 
found that local authorities were failing to plan for 
enough homes to meet local requirements, and that 40% 
had no plans at all. The white paper pointed to failures 
in the planning system, which is widely seen as slow, 
costly and complex. 
Other supply-side barriers include too little land 
suitable for development being made available. An 
important but sensitive part of the debate has to do 
with building on green belt land, juxtaposed with the 
availability of infill, redundant or change-of-use space 
in built-up areas.  
Population declines in some northern cities are the 
counterpart of population increases in southern England 
where land is in short supply. This pattern needs to 
change. Improved regional plans to bring inward 
investment and modernised infrastructure to declining 
areas would help stem this tide.    
Overlaid on this are changing shopping habits leaving 
retail properties in some high streets empty, but also 
providing an opportunity to switch their purpose 
towards residential, community and leisure uses and 
separate people from traffic. (Ideas to release land and 
speed up development are summarised in the House of 
Commons briefing paper cited earlier20.)    
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Chapter 5: 
The implications of housing   
wealth for financial services
Housing wealth is second only to pensions as a source 
of personal wealth in the UK. According to the ONS, 
net housing wealth is estimated at £4.6 trillion with 
65% concentrated in households aged 55+. The median 
wealth based on all asset types, including pensions, 
in the 55-64 age group is over £500,000. This level 
of resources makes it a subject of intense interest for 
addressing a range of later-life issues.
 
This chapter is particularly concerned with the use of 
housing wealth in retirement and the role of financial 
services in unlocking that wealth. Housing is an 
illiquid asset and so releasing equity must involve either 
borrowing against a fixed asset or selling up. The reasons 
for drawing upon housing wealth are varied and need to 
be seen in context. 
Classically, borrowing or selling up is designed to smooth 
consumption over the life cycle or pay off debts. Financial 
necessity, such as paying for long-term care, bequest motives 
and management of tax liabilities make planning for all 
eventualities a fraught and difficult process. Nevertheless, 
the benefits of better planning and execution are tangible 
and result in lifestyle improvements for the individual.
Today, more than 75% of the 55+ age group have 
property wealth. This contrasts with a steep fall in 
property ownership among younger age groups caused 
by the acceleration in house prices, especially since 2000. 
In 1990, 55% of dwellings were owner-occupied. The 
proportion peaked in 2005 at 69% before falling back to 
62% today. It could fall to 50% by 2030, as extrapolated 
from present trends.
Because prices have risen so much, the tendency is to 
buy later, to borrow more and to take longer to pay off 
the debt – often not until owners reach their 60s. To 
illustrate the increasing financial strain involved in house 
purchase, mortgage advances were up to 3.0 times salary 
in 1990 and in 2014, 4.5 times. This is unsustainable in 
the long run and so is house price inflation.
 
This implies that housing wealth cannot be relied upon 
forever as a financial backstop or alternative to a good 
pension or working for longer. There are also risks to the 
loan providers if they over-lend as asset values go into 
decline. It is with these caveats in mind that we consider 
the role of financial services in innovating in the area of 
utilising housing wealth.
This research has already identified demographic ageing 
as among the main causes of rising house prices – 
although it has also set the scene for a fall in the 2020s. 
The rise has been associated with increasing under-
occupation and a growth in second homes (facilitated 
by the accumulation of wealth in the hands of older 
generations), coupled with low rates of house building. 
By far the best way for houses to become affordable is 
for prices to fall and earnings to rise. The government 
can create the tax and policy environment needed to 
encourage the adjustment. Putting the government’s role 
to one side, windfalls in property values have expanded 
the potential role of intergenerational wealth transfers 
though gifting and inheritance. They also provide more 
scope for older people to afford social and long-term care 
and offer new ways to fund retirement. 
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Because rising prices are not a cast-iron certainty, 
expectations must be managed and caution exercised in 
what is an extremely complex area of financial policy 
and regulation. In addition, not all older households are 
lucky enough to own 100% of their equity. 
The number of mortgages being arranged that are expected 
to mature after the customer has reached 65 are increasing. 
While they may still have significant equity in their homes, 
the outstanding debt will reduce their flexibility. 
Box 4 draws a distinction between economic objectives 
and the means of achieving them. It also indicates that 
the options are partly age related and best pursued at 
certain ages rather than being left until it is too late. 
Economic objectives are considered under four headings: 
downsizing, equity release, funding long-term care and 
immediate needs annuities.
Downsizing
Downsizing involves the sale of a person’s or couple’s main 
property and their move to a smaller or less expensive 
one. In order to release cash, the cost of the new property 
must be less than the net proceeds from selling the old 
property, after taking removal and transaction expenses 
into account. The funds released can be used to fund 
retirement, pay off debts and make gifts to heirs. 
Downsizing usually requires a trigger such as retirement, 
children leaving home, the death of a partner, financial 
pressure or becoming too old to cope. The new property 
can be of any kind: it may involve a vacant property, 
moving in with someone else or into a purpose-built 
extension to, or sub-division of, an existing dwelling.   
Research by the IFS found that of those aged 50+ in 
2014-15, in England, 80% were owner-occupiers, 
indicating the potential for people to downsize and 
monetise their wealth21. The probability of moving 
out of owner-occupation increases markedly from age 
80, driven by care needs with the destination being an 
institution or other arrangement offering more support. 
More vacant homes would be created if older households 
downsized sooner – around the time of retirement or after 
the children have left home – in their 50s or 60s. This 
would free up family homes and avoid under-occupancy 
of the existing housing stock, which would help achieve 
policy goals. But, as we have already identified, there is a 
shortage of properties to downsize to. 
Potential downsizers are dissuaded by the shortage of 
affordable alternatives in the areas where they live, small 
room sizes compared with what they are used to and the 
lack of bedroom space for family visits or a live-in carer. 
Some are attracted to retirement communities, although 
this inevitably means dislocation to a degree. 
Others may sell up and move in with relatives or 
companions as a way of freeing up equity. However, one 
of the problems is that selling a house is time consuming 
and stressful and so anything that can be done to ease 
this is helpful. Housing chains are a major cause of 
delay and are unhelpful if there is an urgency to move 
triggered by a particular event such as the death of a 
partner. 
Part exchange, where the builder of the house being 
moved into acquires the purchaser’s property as part of 
the deal, is an intriguing antidote to housing chains. 
This sort of transaction can be used to downsize and 
to release equity in the current home. The potential 
amount realised is diminished, however, because the 
house is bought at below market value to compensate 
the builder for holding it for an indefinite period. 
Currently available schemes apply to most types of 
residential property, regardless of whether the new 
property costs more or less. Benefits of moving into a 
new build include savings on repairs and redecoration, 
but the part-exchange transaction does not come cheap 
and may have strings attached. 
21. Rowena Crawford (2018) Use of primary housing wealth, The use of wealth in retirement 
 IFS Briefing Note BN237 _2018. https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/12959
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Box 4: Monetising housing wealth
There are a range of options for monetising or using housing wealth, depending on a person’s age and 
circumstances. These fall into the four basic types shown in the table. 
Age category Downsizing Equity release Long term care 
insurance
Immediate needs 
annuity (INAs)
A O O P O
B O P P O
C P P P O
D O P O P
Key:  P more likely to apply; O less likely to apply
Downsizing is the exchange of one property for a smaller, less expensive one, in which a profit is made on the 
difference in sale and purchase prices after taxes, moving and transaction costs. It can apply to both the main 
residence and second home.
Equity release is a loan secured on the property; known as a life-time mortgage, it is repaid on death or transfer 
into a care home. Consumers are protected by a non-negative equity guarantee (NNEG) so that there is 
nothing to pay if the home is worth less than the loan on death.
Long-term care insurance involves financial sacrifices through premium payments. This product allows 
purchasers to pay for future care costs via a deferred premium payable after death or sale of the property.
Immediate needs annuity (INA) is an annuity contract that can be financed in cash or through the sale of all 
or part of a property to provide a guaranteed income for life or a specific period of time. It may be used to pay 
for care.
Category A, the under 45s, will usually have outstanding mortgages and family commitments. The only 
category worth considering is long-term care insurance, the premiums for which increase with age. 
Category B, age 45 to 64, is a transition age group and their options will depend on whether they have children 
living with them, or are considering retirement but need more cash to fund it, or wish to make a gift to their 
children.
Category C, age 65 to 74, is the peak age range for equity release, but exchanging equity in the home for long-
term care insurance is also worth consideration. INAs are more typical among older members of this age group.
Category D, aged 75+, downsizing decisions may be driven by changes of circumstance such as ill-health or 
death of a partner. INAs are used to pay for care. 
1 For more information on any of these also see ILC-UK publications archive e.g. The UK Equity Bank – towards income security in old 
age; Flexible and affordable methods of paying for long term care insurance. 
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Downsizing is not guaranteed to release cash in every 
case. The wide range of scenarios includes ones in which 
the downsizers become or remain borrowers. Taking 
out a new mortgage or rolling over the existing one in 
order to downsize is likely to become more common as 
borrowing terms extend beyond the mid-60s.
One option is a fixed-term interest-only mortgage, 
which costs much less per month than a repayment 
mortgage. The borrower simply has to show they can 
afford the monthly interest repayments. Loans are 
usually only paid off when a person dies, moves into 
long-term care or sells up. However, interest payments 
eat into retirement income and failure to keep up with 
payments could result in repossession.
The UK mortgage market comprises about 1.8m 
transactions a year worth £300bn, but less than half 
involve property acquisitions. The rest comprise adding 
to existing mortgages or switching to better deals. 
According to ONS, borrowers age 55+ accounted for less 
than 5% of the market in 2017. This includes life-time 
mortgages, discussed in the next section, which are a 
particular growth area.    
Equity Release Mortgages
The second way to release cash on property wealth is 
through equity release. There are two basic ways of doing 
this – via a life-time mortgage and the much less common 
home reversion. Reversion involves selling all or part of 
your property at less than its market value in return for a 
tax-free lump sum or regular income. Currently, reversion 
plans account for less than 0.1% of new plans according 
to the Equity Release Council Spring 2018 report22.
A life-time mortgage lets a home owner over the age of 
55 access cash based on the value of the home, usually 
at a fixed rate of interest. The loan is repayable on death 
of the surviving owner or their transfer to a care home. 
A life-time mortgage can be thought of as a standard 
mortgage without the need to make regular payments.
Equity release funds can be accessed flexibly – as a 
lump sum or drawn down in small packets as and when 
required. The latter arrangement means that interest 
payments roll up more slowly and so, where there is a 
bequest motive, do not immediately take a large bite out 
of a potential legacy. Loans can also be repaid in full or 
in part if the borrower has cash to spare.
The current industry average borrowing rate for a 
fixed-for-life equity release mortgage is 5.4%. The key 
attraction of an equity release mortgage is that the loan is 
for an indefinite period, during which the borrower does 
not have to pay anything.
Equity release is a major undertaking and should only be 
done with independent advice and in consultation with 
close family. Industry standards known as the safe home 
income plan (SHIP) help protect the consumer – these 
include the promise that borrowers can remain in their 
home for life. They also have the right to port the plan to 
another property and to independent legal advice23.
Risks are significantly reduced by the promise of a no 
negative equity guarantee (NNEG), so that there is 
nothing to pay if the value of the property at the time 
of disposal is less than the principal borrowed and 
accumulated interest. A combination of increases in 
life expectancy and a fall in house prices could tip the 
arrangement into negative equity. As well as protecting the 
consumer, NNEG acts as an antidote to reckless lending.   
The critical measure here is the loan to value (LTV) 
ratio – i.e. the value of the property at the inception of 
the loan. According to the Equity Release Council, the 
current industry LTV average is 32% (e.g. borrowing 
£100,000 against a home worth £300,000)24. Appendix B 
22.  The Equity Release Council represents the vast majority of the equity release sector. Its autumn 2018 report can be found at https://www.
equityreleasecouncil.com/document-library/equity-release-market-report-autumn-2018/
23.  Equity release products are regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Equity Release Council’s code of conduct, the safe home income plan 
(SHIP), introduced in 1991.
24.  See for example ‘Asleep at the wheel The Prudential Regulation Authority & the Equity Release Sector’. (Kevin Dowd. Adam Smith Institute, London 2018), 
which is concerned with risks from the ‘No Negative Equity Guarantee (NNEG)’ consequent on high borrowing and falling property prices.
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analyses this point under a range of scenarios and finds 
30% to be a reasonable benchmark, but it does not 
protect the lender in all foreseeable circumstances.
While equity release does not solve the problem of 
under-occupation, it is clearly a useful mechanism for 
funding retirement plans. The proceeds can be used to 
finance home improvements – including adapting it for 
elderly occupants, gifts and repayment of other debt, 
or to fill a pension hole. But home equity is a finite 
resource.
While, on balance, equity release encourages people 
to stay put, it does not bar downsizing at a later date 
e.g. via the right to port the mortgage or contractual 
downsizing protection. Normally the existence of a 
mortgage on the property is an encumbrance, reducing 
flexibility and limiting the potential net proceeds to put 
towards a new property. 
Monetising equity in a property may also be an aid 
to inheritance tax planning by borrowing just enough 
to remain under the IHT threshold. Under the latest 
pension reforms, unused pension pots can be passed to 
younger generations and are not subject to inheritance 
tax. This arguably boosts the case for equity release 
in cases where it may be better to spend non-pension 
wealth before drawing down pension funds25.
There are potential downsides to equity release. If it is 
used to buy an annuity as protection against longevity, 
income tax might be due and so it is better to put the 
proceeds in a tax-efficient savings vehicle such as an 
ISA or simply to draw down the money only when it is 
needed. The cash generated can also reduce entitlement 
to means-tested benefits if a person would be otherwise 
eligible26.
Since 1991, nearly 420,000 homeowners have accessed 
over £22bn of housing wealth. The market is growing 
with 37,000 new plans in 2017 and borrowing at just 
over £3bn, which has continued to rise rapidly. Average 
borrowing is between £60,000 for drawdown and 
£100,000 as a lump sum, with drawdown customers 
slightly older at 72 than those taking lump-sums who 
average 69. 
Figure 6 shows the progress of the equity release sector 
since SHIP standards were introduced in 1991, with 
forecasts to the end of 2018. The upsurge (from a low 
base) in customers and lending reflects the arrival of big 
new entrants such as Legal & General. It is also a sign of 
growing demand and the competitive deals on offer.
Growth is set to continue, driven by the expanding 
elderly population and pension shortfalls due to the 
demise of defined benefit occupational schemes.
Limitations will be levels of future home ownership in 
the target age group and house prices, which are not 
guaranteed. As borrowers become more familiar with 
the options available, we expect drawdown plans to 
become more popular than lump sums. The advantages 
are a slower roll-up of interest and alignment with tax 
planning.
Paying for long-term care 
 
The massive rise in the number of older people is pushing 
up demand for care. Taken with the tightening of public 
funding, this means most people will be expected to 
contribute to and plan for their own care. How to pay for 
long-term care has been a hot topic in the insurance world 
and government policy circles for years. 
History shows that individuals are very reluctant to save for 
care. The unknown expense of social care is a factor, while 
people are generally loth to pay for an insurance product 
they may never use. The premiums eat into their current 
standard of living or the money set aside for their retirement. 
25.  Any funds paid from your pension to beneficiaries are tax-free, if you die before age 75. Post 75, the inheritor pays income tax at their marginal rate on any 
withdrawals from the fund, whether as a lump sum or income.
26.  The UK Equity Bank - Towards income security in old age. International Longevity Centre -UK
 https://ilcuk.org.uk/the-uk-equity-bank-towards-income-security-in-old-age/
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Figure 6: Chart showing new equity release plans and borrowing levels since 1992 (source: Equity 
Release Council)
It is telling that there are no longer any providers of 
traditional pre-funded long-term care insurance products 
in the UK. Faced with other demands such as mortgage 
payments and supporting children through university, 
people have tended to take their chances with care costs 
rather than pay into insurance schemes.
The cost of long-term care is considerable, with typical 
bills amounting to well in excess of £100,000 for an 
average spell in a care home of 130 weeks. One solution, 
proposed by Mayhew and O’Leary (2014)27, is to 
ringfence a proportion of the equity in the home up to 
the value of any care cap, after which costs would be met 
by the state. This is dependent on the state introducing 
a capped care cost system, as proposed by the Dilnot 
Commission but never implemented28. 
A second potential solution is to use housing wealth 
to purchase an insurance premium that would not 
be payable until after death, avoiding the problem of 
making sacrifices in one’s current standard of living. 
Worked examples are set out in Mayhew et al (2016), in 
which different methods of payment are compared on an 
actuarially fair basis29.
These range from the traditional pre-funded variety 
to one based on using equity in the home with the 
insurance premium paid on death or transfer into 
care. Like the first idea of ringfencing a proportion of 
housing equity, the contract in this case could involve 
committing a proportion of the equity to the insurer or 
some other remuneration mechanism.
This fits well with personal retirement objectives such 
as having spare cash for leisure, holidays and family 
visits, and the ability to gift money to children or 
grandchildren. It also enables people to retain control 
over their finances while having peace of mind that care 
costs will be covered, without falling back on the state. 
Another potential advantage is reducing exposure to 
inheritance tax, since the deferred premium payment 
would be an allowable expense.
27.  L. Mayhew and D. O’Leary: Unlocking the Potential,  DEMOS. https://www.demos.co.uk/project/unlocking-the-potential/  
28.  Fairer Funding for All, Report of the commission on funding care and support. Department of Health 2010. https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/20130221121534/http://www.dilnotcommission.dh.gov.uk/our-report/
29.  L. Mayhew, B. Rickayzen and D. Smith (2016) Flexible and affordable methods of paying for long term care insurance. ILC-UK. https://ilcuk.org.uk/
flexible-and-affordable-methods-of-paying-for-long-term-care-insurance/
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Consider the alternatives for paying for care in Table 9: A: 
do nothing but risk falling back on the state; B: purchase 
insurance with a single premium payment using savings; 
C: make regular monthly or annual premium payments, 
which cease if the product is triggered; or D: purchase by 
a payment after death using the value of the home upon 
sale (this could be based on a percentage of the value of 
the home or by a loan secured against the house).
Based on actuarial methods, this research finds that 
designation of a percentage  of the equity for this 
purpose is fairly priced, with fewer downsides compared 
with paying cash upfront or in instalments. The basic 
pros and cons of each method are contained in the table. 
It can be seen that 'do nothing' results in a saving, but 
only if care is not needed – though clearly this cannot be 
known in advance.
To qualify for state support a person must have assets of 
less than £23,250. Realistically this test would disqualify 
all home owners, which means that their homes are 
at risk and might have to be sold to pay for care. The 
equity-for-insurance idea would provide some protection 
against this eventuality.
Table 9: Pros and cons of long-term care insurance based on method of payment
Category Method of 
payment
No reduction in 
current standard 
of living
Gift opportunity Less likely to fall 
back on the state 
if care needed
Possible 
reduction in 
exposure to IHT*
A Do nothing P P O O
B Regular payments O O P P
C Single premium O O P P
D Housing equity P P P P
Key:  Pmore likely to apply; O less likely to apply; *IHT = Inheritance Tax
Immediate needs annuities
An immediate needs annuity (INA), also known as 
an immediate care plan or care fees’ annuity, pays 
out a guaranteed income for life to help cover the 
cost of care fees in exchange for a one-off lump sum 
payment. The lump sum may come from savings or 
it could be sourced using equity release. The cost may 
be prohibitive at younger ages since the annuity is 
expected to be in force for longer and so might entail 
the sale of the whole property.  
An INA is generally regarded as a ‘back stop’ – a 
product that is bought at the point of need. It provides 
protection against a person’s money running out 
during their stay in a care home. The purpose is to 
cover the shortfall between a person’s income and the 
cost of care until death. Pricing is based on the amount 
of extra income required and the insurer’s assessment 
of how long it will be needed, based on the customer’s 
state of health. 
The annuity is paid directly to the care provider for the 
life of the individual and there is no tax to pay on the 
income. Capital protection allows the original capital 
to be protected in the event of the early death of the 
individual. The percentage of capital to be protected, 
usually up to 75%, would be returned to the estate less 
all income paid to the care home. 
Relatively few INAs are sold each year and they appeal 
to people whose housing wealth makes them ineligible 
for state support, but who do not have sufficient income 
to pay care fees of around £50,000 a year. INAs would, 
arguably, not be needed if there were a stronger insurance 
market for long-term care needs. A parallel in the public 
sector is that local authorities will fund care fees in return 
for proceeds from the sale of the home at a later date.  
O
P
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Chapter 6:
Conclusion
It feels as though the UK housing crisis has been with 
us forever – rising house prices, missed construction 
targets, lack of affordable homes and less social housing. 
Although this research agrees that more houses must be 
built to relieve the pressure on first-time buyers, this will 
not address the growing issue of under-occupancy and 
the lack of affordability caused by population increases 
and ageing. In other words, it is not possible to build our 
way out of the crisis. 
 
The UK’s housing stock is, on paper at least, sufficient 
to meet current housing needs.  However, this statement 
must be tempered by several factors, including the 
high number of second and vacant homes. Using a 
new concept called the Dwelling Index, the research 
tracks the big increase under way in the number of 
older people living alone or in couples. This trend is 
set to continue for the next two decades and with it the 
problem of under-occupancy and vacant housing. The 
implications are hugely significant in terms of the UK’s 
capacity to meet current and future housing needs.
Between 2020 and 2030, the number of households 
is set to rise by around 2m to 30.7m, but 35% of the 
increase will comprise older households and, of these, 
61% will be one-person. The outlook is similar for 2030 
to 2040, with further growth of 1.6m in the number of 
households to 32.3m – 38% of the additions are forecast 
to be older households, with 67% of those one-person. 
Without any change, this spells a very inefficient use of 
the housing stock, not to mention the health and social 
care implications of so many older, often frail, people 
living alone.
By contrast, family households are expected to grow by 
only 1.6% from 6.4m to 6.5m between 2020 and 2030 
and by 0.5% between 2030 and 2040. To understand 
the extent of the mismatch, the analysis compared 
the type of accommodation available with housing 
needs, using the Dwelling Index and government space 
standards. We found that while 60% of homes have 
three or more bedrooms, there would be a much closer 
fit with dwelling needs if only 46% had three.
As the population ages, the degree of misalignment 
will increase, aggravating wealth inequalities between 
generations. The case for downsizing strengthens as 
people age, but current policies are having a deterrent 
effect due to high transaction costs and a lack of suitable 
properties to downsize into. This area needs urgent 
attention – whether it is building more attractive 
age-friendly and suitably sized apartments, or more 
retirement communities.
The Dwelling Index is positively correlated with house 
prices. For 1980 to 2015, when average house prices rose 
12-fold, it showed that the key reasons were increases in 
second homes and immigration, with an indirect impact 
on private renting, too.  Previously the best predictor of 
house prices was earnings, but this link ruptured after 
2000 with house prices now eight times average earnings 
compared with about five times then. 
The research predicts a fall in prices in the 2020s due to 
demographic factors. The most important of these are 
that baby boomers will start to die out and demand for 
housing from people of working age will level out. Both 
will help younger buyers, especially if accompanied by 
faster rises in average earnings. In the meantime, more 
new homes are needed, but to avoid a treadmill of ever-
increasing housing stock coupled with falling occupancy, 
other measures are required. 
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Policies need to be closely aligned so that more efficient 
use is made of the housing stock. This means building 
more affordable houses for ownership and rent. House 
builders and local authorities hold the key to investment 
decisions, with reform of the planning process playing an 
integral part. Central government has the power to reform 
the planning system and reduce transaction costs, notably 
taxes, in a targeted way to encourage downsizing. 
One of the key findings is that housing policy is piecemeal 
and too focused on first-time buyers, addressing symptoms 
rather than the underlying causes. We recommend that 
attention should also focus on ‘last-time buyers’ to ensure 
that downsizing plays a bigger role in the solution. 
The role of financial services is crucial. The industry 
controls mortgage lending, including equity release, 
and can also provide housing-backed insurance to 
cover future care costs. The aim is to enable people to 
monetise their housing wealth to help fund a better 
retirement, move to more suitable accommodation and 
pay for social care. 
However, individuals act within the parameters of fiscal 
policy, government investment in housing, tax and the 
regulation. If these are wrongly aligned, they can be 
counter productive
It is important, therefore, that the government 
understands the full effects of an ageing population 
on housing needs and that policies affecting housing 
all pull in the same direction. The summary at the 
beginning of this report sets out our recommendations, 
which are designed to provide a consistent and more 
strategic approach. They include an increased role 
for financial services in providing more flexible and 
innovative products to meet the needs of the ageing 
population.
By drawing together the available evidence, this research 
has been able to put a scale on the issues that the UK 
faces for the first time, in the context of an ageing 
population. The results demonstrate the case for a more 
holistic approach to housing policy and housing-related 
finance in order to:
•	 better align the housing stock with accommodation 
needs;
•	 improve incentives for downsizing; and
•	 to free up housing wealth. 
While policy-makers recognise the existence of a 
‘housing crisis’, it is not clear that they have grasped 
both the scale and the changing nature of the problem. 
Without a clear evidence base and a holistic approach, 
it will be impossible to draw up coherent plans to tackle 
both the housing shortage and the needs of an ageing 
population. 
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Appendix A: Enumerating household types
This appendix describes the enumeration of all possible 
household types based on the number of occupants (n) 
and their ages (r). 
It is quickly apparent that as the number of permitted 
occupants and age brackets increases, the number of 
household types tends to become impractically large. 
Box 5 sets out the mathematical formula, based on 
occupancy and age mix, while the table enumerates all 
possible combinations with up to 6 age brackets and 6 
occupants per household. For example, it shows there 
are 35 distinct ways of arranging households containing 
4 occupants and age groups.   
We commissioned tables from the ONS for England and 
Wales to determine how many people live in each of the 
286 types with up to 10 residents per household. This 
shows that actual occupancy peaks at 4 persons per 
household with over 12m such households in practice. 
Although the number with 10 or more people is small 
(less than 100,000), we retain them for completeness. 
As in Chapter 1, we use age brackets 0-19, 20-64 and 
65+. This gives 286 discrete household types plus a 
residual category reserved for 11+ households. While 
this produces a table showing the number of possible 
household arrangements, it does not tell us how many 
of each household type there are – for example, single 
adults, couples or families.  
The next stage is to distil them into the reduced number 
of household types based on the eight types, A to 
H, defined in Table 4, Chapter 2. Table A1 shows a 
simplified example for up to 4 persons and three age 
groups. It has 35 rows because there 35 possible 
household combinations. 
The presence of one or more persons in a given age 
bracket is shown in columns a, b and c. The next 
column gives total occupancy by household type 
and is the sum of the previous three columns. A final 
column shows corresponding household types from 
A to H. 
With up to 4 occupants, there are 3 distinct types of 
A and B households, 9 of type C, 4 of type E, and 
3 of type F. Type D and G households are 1-person 
households – by definition, only one distinct type. 
The residual category, H, has 10 variants including 
households with no occupants (voids), bringing the 
total rows to 35.
Older households (Types C and D) are statistically more 
likely and increasingly common, compared with Type E 
three-generational households with live-in grandparents. 
This was not always the case – in previous generations 
Type E households were far more common.
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Box 5: Enumerating all possible household sub-types based on age and occupancy
Although there are only eight basic types of household, 
these can be broken down into many sub-types depending 
on the age, sex and number of residents. Such detail is not 
required here, but it is important to be able to enumerate 
any population by household size and age group to 
determine their living and space requirements.
This is a combinatorial problem, which in layman’s terms 
is defining the number of possible permutations of a set of 
objects into discrete classes. In this case it is the number 
of different household types that can be generated from 
sorting a given number of age categories among different 
household sizes.
Mathematically, the formula for the number of N household 
arrangements, with r age categories and up to n people is 
given by:  
where n is the number of occupants per household (0, 1, 
2, 3, 4…n) and r is the number of age categories (1, 2, 3, 
4….r). Each term inside the brackets multiplied by r gives 
the number of households with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4…n people plus 
one further combination for the ‘void’ case (i.e. an empty 
property).
A simplified version of the formula, in which the number of 
possible arrangements of N households with r age groups 
and n occupants, is given by:
From this formula we can construct the following table, 
which shows the number of possible arrangements of up 
to 6 occupants and 6 age groups. For example, there are 
a total of 1+3+6+10+15=35 combinations of household 
types with 3 age categories and from 0 to 4 people, if the 
void case is included (i.e. a household with no people). 
This is highlighted in row three of the table below which 
adds to 35. Note that this is the same as the number 
of combinations with one to 5 age groups and 2 per 
household, for 4 age groups with 4 per household, and for 
5 age groups with 3 per household.
Number of people per household, n
number 
of age 
categories 
(r)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 1 3 6 10 15 21 28
4 1 4 10 20 35 56 84
5 1 5 15 35 70 126 210
6 1 6 21 56 126 252 462
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Table A1: Mapping household demographic combinations on to the eight standard types, A to H, for three age 
groups and up to four occupants (breakdowns by household types for households with 4+ occupants not shown 
due to lack of space.)
Household 
sub-type 
Age group
0-19
(a)
Age group
20-64
(b)
Age group
65+
(c)
Household 
occupancy 
(a+b+c)
Standard
household
type
1 0 0 0 0 void
2 0 0 1 1 D
3 0 1 0 1 G
4 1 0 0 1 H
5 0 1 1 2 C
6 0 0 2 2 C
7 0 2 0 2 F
8 1 1 0 2 B
9 1 0 1 2 H
10 2 0 0 2 H
11 0 2 1 3 C
12 0 1 2 3 C
13 0 0 3 3 C
14 0 3 0 3 F
15 1 2 0 3 A
16 1 1 1 3 E
17 1 0 2 3 H
18 2 1 0 3 B
19 2 0 1 3 H
20 3 0 0 3 H
21 0 3 1 4 C
22 0 2 2 4 C
23 0 1 3 4 C
24 0 0 4 4 C
25 0 4 0 4 F
26 1 3 0 4 A
27 1 2 1 4 E
28 1 1 2 4 E
29 1 0 3 4 H
30 2 2 0 4 A
31 2 1 1 4 E
32 2 0 2 4 H
33 3 1 0 4 B
34 3 0 1 4 H
35 4 0 0 4 H
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Appendix B: The ‘No Negative Equity 
Guarantee’
All Equity Release plans approved by the Equity Release 
Council include a No Negative Equity Guarantee 
(NNEG). This prevents a person from owing more than 
their home is worth when they buy a life-time mortgage. 
This appendix provides a visual interpretation of how it 
works.
With a life-time mortgage, it is unnecessary to make any 
repayments until the property is sold. This is usually after 
death or on moving into long-term residential care. At 
this point, the equity release provider reclaims the sum 
borrowed plus all of the interest due. 
NNEG may be triggered if too much has been borrowed 
(i.e. there is a high loan to value ratio), if house prices fail 
to grow at the assumed rate, or if a person lives longer 
than expected. The following examples are based on a 
fixed-for-life borrowing rate of 5.4%, the current industry 
average. 
Rows in the table show the loan-to-value ratio, and the 
columns show the assumed house price inflation per 
annum. In the green shaded area there is a greater than 
50% chance of the amount owed being repaid in full; in 
the red-shaded area there is a 50% or greater chance 
that the NNEG will be triggered.  
The size of each shaded area is determined by median 
cohort life expectancy at age 70 in 2018 (source ONS) – 
the typical age of equity release users. Because women 
live longer (median age of death is 90) it means the 
green area is larger for men (median age 88). It implies 
that a typical loan might not be repaid for, say, 20 years 
if it is taken as a lump sum at age 70.
The risk for lenders depends heavily on future house 
prices. For example, if house prices fell by 3.5% per 
annum a property would be worth only half its original 
value; but if they increased by 3.5% it would be worth 
twice as much (all figures are approximate). Chapter 3 
showed that prices are at historically high levels. 
Responsible lending involves taking a view on the value 
of each of these parameters over a long period. Crudely 
speaking, if the maximum loan-to-value ratio is 0.3 then 
NNEG would be triggered in 17% of scenarios in the 
case of women, but if the maximum loan-to-value ratio 
was 0.75 then it would be triggered in about 50% of 
cases. 
Looked at in a different way, a loan-to-value ratio of 0.4 
would require, for women, 2% annual house price falls 
to trigger NNEG in 50% of scenarios, whereas a ratio of 
0.8 requires annual house price rises of at least 1% to 
avoid an NNEG trigger in 50% of scenarios. The current 
industry loan to value average is 0.315 according the 
Equity Release Council’s spring 2018 report, which 
appears to be prudent.
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Figure B1: Chance of triggering the NNEG
 
Women (a) 
          House price inflation per annum 
Loan to 
value ratio -4% -3% -2% -1% 0 +1% 2% +3% 4% 
0.05 32 36 41 48 57 70 91 130 224 
0.10 25 28 32 37 44 54 70 100 172 
0.15 20 23 26 30 36 44 58 82 142 
0.20 17 19 22 26 31 38 49 70 120 
0.25 15 17 19 22 26 33 42 60 104 
0.30 13 14 17 19 23 28 37 52 90 
0.35 11 13 14 17 20 25 32 46 79 
0.40 10 11 13 15 17 21 28 40 69 
0.45 9 10 11 13 15 19 24 35 60 
0.50 7 8 10 11 13 16 21 30 52 
0.55 6 7 8 10 11 14 18 26 45 
0.60 5 6 7 8 10 12 16 22 38 
0.65 5 5 6 7 8 10 13 19 32 
0.70 4 4 5 6 7 8 11 15 27 
0.75 3 3 4 5 5 7 9 12 22 
0.80 2 3 3 4 4 5 7 10 17 
0.85 2 2 2 3 3 4 5 7 12 
0.90 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 5 8 
0.95 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 
1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Men (b) 
          House price inflation per annum 
Loan to 
value ratio -4% -3% -2% -1% 0 +1% 2% +3% 4% 
0.05 32 36 41 48 57 70 91 130 224 
0.10 25 28 32 37 44 54 70 100 172 
0.15 20 23 26 30 36 44 58 82 142 
0.20 17 19 22 26 31 38 49 70 120 
0.25 15 17 19 22 26 33 42 60 104 
0.30 13 14 17 19 23 28 37 52 90 
0.35 11 13 14 17 20 25 32 46 79 
0.40 10 11 13 15 17 21 28 40 69 
0.45 9 10 11 13 15 19 24 35 60 
0.50 7 8 10 11 13 16 21 30 52 
0.55 6 7 8 10 11 14 18 26 45 
0.60 5 6 7 8 10 12 16 22 38 
0.65 5 5 6 7 8 10 13 19 32 
0.70 4 4 5 6 7 8 11 15 27 
0.75 3 3 4 5 5 7 9 12 22 
0.80 2 3 3 4 4 5 7 10 17 
0.85 2 2 2 3 3 4 5 7 12 
0.90 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 5 8 
0.95 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 
1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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